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"While it is difficult to justify this assumption, it is 
more difficult to find a better one".
A.J. Harrison & D.A. Quarmby (1969, p.179) with reference to 
a typical element of cost-benefit analysis*
P R E F A C E .
This dissertation sets out to examine the theory, 
applicability and practice of cost-benefit analysis as an 
evaluation technique in urban transport planning. Discussion 
is intended to focus on the areas of contention and possible 
improvement, especially with a view to incorporating 
distributional and social issues. Although the main field of 
interest is in relation to urban public transport, the general 
nature of the transport problem demands reference to private 
and inter-urban transit as well.
Originally, there was to have been a second part to this 
dissertation, a case study to illustrate the points made in the 
main body of text. Unfortunately, this perhaps over-ambitious 
idea foundered on unavailability of information, frozen partly as 
a result of the foil crisis1 and its political implications in 
reviving public transport schemes previously discounted as 
unfeasible and, therefore, ideal for student study. However, it 
is to be hoped that the main text will prove adequate in itself 
in firmly establishing the relevant issues, if in a more 
generalised and abstracted context.
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CHAPTER 1.
INTRODUCTION TO COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS.
Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) is a method of appraising the 
value of a public investment project or indicating the most suit­
able choice among alternative schemes by taking into account all 
resultant effects, both costs and benefits, social as well as 
economic, on the comparative base of monetary evaluation, as far 
as is possible. Such an ambitious attempt to solve the problem 
of public expenditure decision-making is necessarily fraught with 
inadequacies, imperfections and, perhaps invalidities, causing 
CBA1s once fashionable stature in the 1960's to have become 
tainted in many quarters with severe scepticism, notably gener­
ated by the public disillusionment over the Roskill Commissions 
elaborate exercise (H.M.S.O., 1969-1970), dismissed by one 
academic as !nonsense on stilts1 (Self, 1970). However, CBA 
still survives in the Government view, at least, as the most 
satisfactory appraisal technique for its transport investment.
The application of CBA in public investment is necessitated 
by the consideration of all external effects, not included in the 
conventional financial appraisal in the private sector concerning 
only direct market operations. Although the concept of optimis­
ing the ’social benefits’ of investments originated in this con-
x
text with Dupuit’s pioneering work (1844), nineteenth century
x Perhaps the very first recorded form of CBA occured in Britain 
from around 1820 onwards. It involved the calculation of the change 
in consumer’s surplus (though not identified as such) enjoyed by 
travellers, expressed in terms of the reduction in effort required 
to pull vehicles consequent upon decreasing gradients, subsequently 
becoming *a principal design consideration for engineers’. It was 
used extensively and profitably, for example, by Macneil, one of 
Telford's engineers, working in 1830 on the construction of the 
London-Holyhead road, now the A5. (Starkie, 1973).
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laissez faire ideals obscured such ideas, until the emergence of 
Pigou's treatise on 'welfare economics' (1920), in which he dis­
tinguished between private and social costs, recognising that the 
market system failed to incorporate the latter, thus producing 
sub-optimal allocation where such externalities existed.
The original field of practice developed in American 
water resource studies, implicitly as early as 1902 in the River 
and Harbor Act, but evolving largely from the explicit require­
ment of the 1936 Flood Control Act that flood control schemes 
would only be authorised if the benefits 'to whomsoever they may 
accrue' exceeded the estimated cost. Then the 1950 U.S. Green 
Book (U.S. Government) codified the recommended CBA principles 
and practices, finally validated by the major academic public­
ations of 1958. (Eckstein, McKean, Krutilla and Eckstein).
However, despite the obvious externalities in river development 
schemes demanding such analysis, transport, in fact, claimed 
perhaps the first formal CBA application in 1937 in the evaluat- 
ion of Oregon’s Highway Plan (McCullogh and Beakey)•
In Britain, cost-benefit appraisal techniques in the 
planning and transport sphere were initiated by Lichfield (1956) 
with his 'planning balance sheet* approach to the analysis of 
urban development, followed three years later by Wibberly's 
(1959) studies of land allocation between agriculture and urban 
development. The first major CBA study, that of the Ml, the 
London-Birmingham Motorway, commissioned in 1958, appeared in 
I960, "undertaken as a subject of research to see whether reliable 
methods of assessing both the traffic that would flow upon it and
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the economic value of the scheme could be devised” (Cobum et.al., 
I960, preface). The basic principles defined in that study were 
then formulated by one of its authors, Reynolds (1961), into a 
generalised technique for application to inter-urban road projects. 
Refining the techniques further, Foster and Beesley (1963) produced 
a CBA of the Victoria Line, a new underground railway line in 
London, although as with the Ml study, primarily as a research 
exercise, since the decision to build was taken before the apprai­
sal results were established. In the same year, following the same 
basic concepts, though applying a more qualitative weighting pro­
cedure, Buchanans Traffic in Toms (Lichfield and Crompton,1963) 
also contained an outline evaluation system for his fundamental 
rationalisation of the transport problem.
Continuing development and refinements of cost-benefit 
x
techniques prompted the Government in 1966 to stress their 
increasing confidence in long-term planning "through the devel­
opment of better methods to measure and compare the cost-effect- 
iveness of alternative courses of action" (H.M.S.O., 1966).
CBA was adopted as standard practice in calculating the economic 
return for inter-urban road schemes in 1967 (M.O.T.), and many 
other varied studies undertaken, including urban land-use/ 
transportation plans, consolidated both practical expertise and 
methodology, perhaps culminating in the technical sophistication, 
unfortunately tempered by public disenchantment with its political 
manipulation, of the Roskill Commissions inquiry into the phas­
ing and location of London* s Third Airport (H.M.S.O. 1969 and 
1970).
x Particularly with reference to studies evaluating alternatives 
for the development of the nuclear power programme and the expan­
sion of the South Wales iron ore ports (H.M.S.O. 1966).
CBA remains the accepted statutory method of evaluating both 
road and public transport schemes, being required by the D.O.E. 
for both its own schemes and as the basis for assessing whether 
financial aid will be granted to local authority proposals. In 
the case of inter-urban roads, a major improvement occurred in 
1972 with the adoption of the COBA method (D.O.E. 1972a), 
replacing the former Hl/71 system (D.O.E. 1971), updated from 
the 1967 outline, which only weighed construction costs against 
the user benefits of reductions in delay, operating costs and 
accidents on a simple first year rate of return basis. The COBA 
method (D.O.E. 1973)> published in detailed, analytical form in 
October, evaluates over the approximate period of the road!s 
life by the discounting concept and incorporates recent research 
findings into a readily applied computer programme, into which 
the specific project details can be easily inserted. Urban roads 
present a considerably more intricate and politically delicate 
evaluation task, in which techniques must be conducted on a 
network-wide analysis in view of the degree of inter-relation of 
the cityfs elements and the problems of integration into the 
existing urban fabric.
On the passenger transport side, until very recently, the 
low priority assigned to investment, as a result of the dominant 
demands of ever-increasing car ownership for extensions and impro­
vements to the road system, was matched by consequent lack of 
development of appropriate CBA techniques, after the foundation 
work of the Victoria Line Study in 1963 (op.cit.). In fact, 
apart from the London-Boumemouth rail electrification scheme and 
the evaluation procedures in some urban land-use/transportation
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studies, CBA was prominent primarily "as an aid to the examinat­
ion of railway passenger closure proposals’* (M.O.T. 1969a, preface), 
developed by the case study of the Cambrian Coast Line.
However, a fundamental change in government policy from 
road, especially urban motorways, to public transport investment 
was announced in July 1973* The White Paper (H.M.S.O, 1973) 
recognised that wsome cities will need new or improved capital- 
intensive fixed-track systems” and that road improvements should 
be designed with regard "to the help they can give to bus oper­
ation", with urban transportation techniques requiring to be 
suitably adjusted to accommodate these new objectives. At 
present, though, there is no standardised public transport equiv­
alent to the COBA Manual (D.O.E. 1973), and local authorities or 
Passenger Transport Executives submit their own analyses, based 
on the updated time values from the 1969 M.O.T. figures (op.cit.) 
usually discounted over thirty years at 10$, to support their 
application for an infrastructure grant under the terms of 
Section 56 of the 1968 Transport Act.
With the scale of public investment increasing rapidly 
and the imminent expansion of passenger transport facilities, 
the demand for suitable appraisal techniques to aid decision­
making continues. CBA remains the most widely used method, but 
as its many critics readily point out, it still suffers, at least, 
from numerous technical and practical shortcomings and, at most, 
major methodological uncertainties. Generally, a more satisfact­
ory technique would emerge from a better interpretation or form­
ulation of the basic transportation models to facilitate the
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appraisal of individual links, a greater understanding of the 
relationships between land use and transportation, consideration 
of factors with less bias from institutional constraints and 
perhaps, most importantly, a clearer specification and incor­
poration of the distributive effects. It is intended that this 
dissertation should be directed towards the examination of 
such points, perhaps producing some tentative suggestions or 
indications for improving investment appraisal practices in 
public transport projects.
CHAPTER 2.
THE THEORY OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
The aim of CBA is to guide the decision-maker into chan­
nelling resources into projects which will yield the greatest 
gain in net benefit to society. In order to achieve this, an 
objective function defining the values under which social 
welfare is construed must be stated at the outset.
In standard CBA, following from the U.S. Flood Control 
Act of 1936, the decision objectives are most commonly expressed 
implicitly in the form of the Pigovian Social Welfare Function 
(SWF), as defined by Foster (1966), which holds that all costs 
and benefits to whomsoever they accrue are to be accounted 
according to the existing price schema, under the assumption 
that the marginal utility of money is constant* This function 
is basically Paretian, but incorporates the Kaldor-Hicks (1939) 
concepts of hypothetical compensation, thus adopting the primary 
goal of efficiency, as measured by a net increase in national 
wealth, while assuming away possibly adverse distributive effects. 
Such a decision function is usually justified by claims that 
redistributive effects are minimal anyway, that any redistrib­
ution is best effected through taxation and that the present 
distribution of income, as it is, is generally acceptable. A 
minor distributive objective may be internalised in the function 
where a project is to be financed, at least partially, through 
price discrimination, voluntary contributions or taxation 
subventions.
Often, the Pigovian SWF is qualified by an income distrib­
ution constraint that nobody loses more than a specific or propor­
tional amount as a result of the possible decision. Alternatively, 
the objective may be to stress income redistribution by maximis­
ing net benefits to a disadvantaged sector, perhaps limited to a 
degree by an efficiency constraint. A more complex, though desir­
able, type of SWF is one which assigns varied weights to differ­
ent types of benefits and costs according to which classes they 
affect. Such a function would necessarily have to be numerically 
specific in its weightings and categorisations, and would require 
detailed data of a highly disaggregated nature.
However, following standard practice, a Pigovian SWF is 
implicitly adopted, perhaps with some distributional consider­
ations at the output, and the CBA proceeds in five basic stages
1) The identification and enumeration of all relevant 
costs and benefits.
2) Their evaluation, as far as possible, in monetary terms.
3) The choice and application of a suitable discount rate.
U) The treatment of risk and uncertainty.
5) The decision recommendation according to the appropriate 
formula and constraints.
2.1 Definition of Costs and Benefits.
The initial requirement is to define precisely the extent 
and expected life of the project under appraisal. This procedure 
generally identifies the direct costs, that is the value of goods 
and services required Hto establish, maintain and operate a 
project11 (Eckstein 1965, p.51)* Such costs in public transport 
investment usually occur through a combination of land acquisit­
ion, engineering, construction and the provision of new vehicular 
or rolling stock on the capital side and maintenance, operation 
and energy costs on the running side.
The real (i.e. opportunity) costs of the investment are 
in those goods and services which have been foregone because of 
the diversion to the project of resources that might have 
produced them. However, because of monopolistic practice, 
imperfect knowledge, indivisibities, government intervention and 
so on, the relevant market prices will differ from these true 
opportunity costs. In standard practice though, direct costs 
are simply itemised at their market prices, with any differential 
from the real opportunity cost perhaps recorded as a positive or 
negative benefit, either by use of shadow or surrogate pricing, 
though often just left unquantified as an 1 intangible1.
The direct benefits conceptually are equal to the value 
of "immediate products or services resulting from the measures 
for which the project costs were incurred" (ibid). In most public 
transport CBA, the term !user benefit1 collectively covers direct 
benefits, which consist mostly of time savings. Time, as such,
has no market price and so must be attributed a derived surrogate 
value in the evaluation process.
Then, according to the different systems of classificat­
ion, there are the secondary benefits, such as the utilisation 
in the project*s construction of unemployed labour which involves 
no social opportunity cost, indeed having a positive subjective 
effect in morale-boosting. This induced benefit will then be 
extended through the multiplier effect depending on the level of
unemployment in the area in the development of * stemming*
©
activities. However, there may be secondary costs involved in 
the mobilisation of factors and capital opportunities foregone 
and these must be set off against the benefits to give a net 
figure for secondary effects, which stand as prime consider­
ations in income distribution and the promotion of regional 
development.
The external effects of the project are the most difficult 
to identify but are vital to the analysis, constituting the basic 
rationale behind the cost-benefit approach. Externalities are 
those effects caused by the project but not compensated for by 
the market, representing Pigou*s (1920) initial concern with the 
deviation of market prices from social costs. Typically, the 
externalities arising from public transport schemes involve 
environmental factors, such as noise, visual intrusion, fumes,
© of course, these benefits will be common to all alternative 
projects in the same area, except in so far as they might employ 
differing quantities of labour, but they are extremely relevant 
to the question of inter-regional investment allocation.
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vibration, glare and ecological impact^  relief of congestion 
elsewhere, comfort considerations, increased job opportunities 
and extensions of labour pools and the multifarious social and 
planning implications of increased accessibility. Externalities, 
while difficult to identify precisely and independently, as well 
as involving dangers of double counting, prove even more problem­
atic in their evaluation, since by definition they have no 
direct market price. Often they are simply listed and left 
unquantified as 1 intangibles1.
In the classification, costs, especially external, other 
than the direct capital involved, are sometimes included as 
negative benefits, in order to separate the ongoing effects from 
the once and for all investment outlay. This practice can 
present problems in the comparison of projects and the calcul­
ation of benefit/cost ratios, and even a consistent categoris­
ation procedure throughout can produce anomalies in the sensitive 
ratio determination. However, with the increasing influence of 
absolute figures representing the net present value of a project 
in decision-making, this classification deficiency, which is 
rectified simply by more stringent definitional application, 
becomes relatively insignificant in current CBA,
Pecuniary spillovers, as distinct from technological 
externalities discussed above, will also occur in the form of 
changed output or utility of any third party due to changes in 
demand caused by the project, but they should not be included in 
the efficiency analysis as they are simply monetary transfers 
not affecting the aggregate of social welfare, but only its
distribution. In this last respect, they should be recorded for 
consideration by the decision-maker. The major pecuniary external 
effects resulting from public transport investment will usually 
be increases in land values and rents around the points of 
improved accessibility, with perhaps corresponding falls in 
places less well favoured. Since an increase in land values is 
merely the capitalisation of the value of reductions in travel 
costs, it is an expression of the time savings already included 
in the direct benefits and therefore must not be counted, so that 
duplication is avoided.
Together, the above categories should cover all costs and 
benefits, but, in addition, their variation over time must be 
specified in order to derive accurate discounted values. This 
involves highly subjective estimates based on assessments of 
physical length of life, technological changes, shifts in demand, 
emergence of competing products and a whole range of exogenous 
factors. Accurate predictions become more important the lower 
the discount rate, since future figures will register greater 
significance in present value terms. Kuhn (1962,p.64.) suggests 
that Mas a general rule, unless compelling reasons dictate other­
wise, the life of a public project should not be assumed to
exceed 40 years, for shorter periods simply introduce greater
x
prudence into the planning process”. However, with discount- 
x
Current British CBA practice favours evaluation over a 30 year 
period. (D.O.E, 1972 a, G.G.T.S./fe.R, 1973).
ing rates as high as 10$ plus currently, the project life problem 
is not so severe, as short-term effects assume almost overriding 
significance, and the additional application of sensitivity 
analysis can indicate the impact of the forecasting assumptions 
involved for the consideration of the decision-maker.
Once all costs and benefits have been enumerated and 
specified over time, the CBA can proceed to the evaluation stage.
.2 Evaluation
In order to maintain consistency with the overall CBA 
objective of maximising the SWF, it is necessary to ensure that 
the prices attached to the benefits and costs reflect accurately 
society*s valuation of the goods, services and resources involved.
On the benefits side, their collective worth will be 
represented by the aggregation of individual*s willingness to 
pay for them as indicated by their demand curves. However, since 
this total would require investment to the point of zero price to 
absorb all demand, that is the whole area under the demand curve, 
there has to be a supply/cost consideration to avoid over-invest- 
raent and inefficient allocation of resources. Thus, in the 
diagram below, with AB representing the demand curve for speed, 
comfort, convenience, etc. and CD representing the marginal costs 
of providing varying standards of public transport services, 
then market forces would settle the service provision at level 
OQ^ at user costs of OP^. But though total revenue equivalent 





willingness-to-pay equals ADQ^O, since there are OQ^ people 
prepared to pay more than the market price OP^ in varying 
degrees according to the demand curve. Thus the 1 consumer1 s 
surplus1 is represented by triangle AP3D and, similarly, 
•producer1 s surplus* is equal to the triangle CPjJD. If a new 
project were to produce a marginal cost curve EF, consumer*s 
surplus would increase by P3DFP2 to triangle AP2F and the 
producer's surplus would increase from triangle CP2.D to trian­
gle P2EF, giving an overall net increase in the combined surplus­
es of triangle DFG. Dupuit (1844) originally theorised that the 
net increase in the combined surpluses through a public project, 
as in triangle DFG, was a direct cardinal indication of the 
resultant improvement in social welfare. This proposition, of 
course, assumes that the marginal utility of income is constant, 
even with changing prices. Marshall (1890), the master margin- 
alist, later refined this basic work and held that changes in 
consumer's surplus alone indicated social welfare changes.
Mishan (1972) also concurs that producer's surplus does not 
merit inclusion, being merely a form of economic rent.
Although the Marshallian approach has been severely 
criticised by those who argue that utility cannot be measured 
cardinally, only ordinally, and therefore cannot be compared 
between individuals, consumer surplus survives as a major 
conceptual foundation of CBA. However, its use demands accept­
ance of the Kaldor-Hicks compensation criterion which states 
that social welfare is bettered overall if the gainers from a 
change can compensate the losers and still profit, necessarily
therefore involving interpersonal comparisons of utility (Kaldor, 
1939; Hicks 1939)* This converts the distributively neutral but 
excessively restrictive Pareto optimality condition that a change 
can only be approved if nobody loses out, and that at least one 
person gains, into a useful form for practical prescription. 
However, it refers only to potential compensation, the efficiency 
criterion, so that unless fiscal arrangements are self-adjusting 
to effect the necessary transfers, the distributive effect could 
well be regressive, and, indeed, Scitovsky (1942) identified the 
paradoxical situation where the distributive effects might result 
in the losers 'bribing1 gainers to return the position back to 
the status quo, so that no clear-cut welfare gain may be discerned.
Even without considering the distributive reservations 
and the false assumption of the constant marginal utility of 
income, the derivation of consumers surplus requires the identif­
ication of the full demand curve, which is only partial in con­
text and tends to indeterminacy at its extremities. However, 
despite the difficulties, consumer surplus is incorporated to a 
large extent in public transport CBA, since the valuation put on 
time savings, the major element on the benefits side, is derived 
from behavioural studies, although the standardisation into 
average values for practical purposes does destroy some of its 
theoretical validity.
Where benefits do have a market price, it can be used, 
after adjustment for the basic market imperfections, to indic­
ate society's willingness-to-pay. Referring to the same diagram, 
the reasoning is as follows :-
Total willingness-to-pay (WTP) = Price (P). Quantity (Q)
+ Consumer's surplus (CS)
i.e. ADQjO = . OQ^ + AP]D
With new project,
Change in WTP (dWTP) = AFQ20 - ADQ10
= DFQ2Q 1 
= Q]_Q2* OP2 + DTH
= change in quantity, new price + •£ 
change in quantity, change in price
Therefore, dWTP = dQ (Po + ^ 1*^2
2
= dQ (P1 * p2)
2
If the investment causes only a marginal shift in prices, then
it can be assumed that P^ and P2 are more or less equal, and
therefore the market price, once adjusted, represents the WTP 
per person.
dWTP = dQ. (2P) = dQ.P
2
Therefore, dWTP = P
dQ
Since neither condition that market prices equal marginal 
costs nor that marginal cost reflects the true social cost of 
resources obtains in the real world, the market does not produce 
the optimal set of prices. The divergence between market and 
social valuations exists because of monopolistic structures, 
indivisibilities, taxation and government intervention, extern­
alities, multiplier effects, collective goods, imperfect know­
ledge and various non-equilibrating forces. The theoretical 
alternative to unsatisfactory market prices is the derivation 
and use of shadow prices.
Shadow prices can be defined as the marginal rate of sub­
stitution between the 'outputs1 in question* incorporating both 
the willingness-to-pay and opportunity cost concepts. The actual 
values represented by shadow prices depend on the objective 
function being maximised, which, in the case of standard CBA, 
is of the Paretian/Pigovian type, concerned purely with 
'efficiency' in allocation to the exclusion of distribution, so 
that the shadow pricing rule is to value at marginal social cost. 
However, since prices in the private sector continually fail to 
reflect marginal social costs, it is not theoretically possible 
to state that the use of shadow pricing in public projects will 
bring a necessarily better overall allocation in society, since 
the Paretian optimum will still not be attained. In essence, 
this is the 'second-best problem', whose nihilism is avoided by 
those who claim that, in the absence of any better rule, shadow 
pricing according to social marginal cost is the most likely to 
steer allocation in the right direction towards ultimate 
efficiency.
In practice, the difficulties of deriving marginal 
social cost curves to indicate shadow prices are severe, so 
the compromise of using market prices, where they exist, is 
usually adopted, with any important differentials from social 
valuation, through externalities or other factors, recorded 
separately in the list of items.
The greatest problem, though, is in evaluating the 
'intangibles', such as amenity, for which there is no market 
indication as to their monetary values. Consumer question-
naires, behavioural studies, identification of similar goods and 
services in the market to give surrogate prices, the cost of 
provision and the shadow prices implicit in government decisions 
are all methods of varying validity, practicality and applicab­
ility for the derivation of monetary values for intangibles. 
Often, however, intangibles, especially the more abstract, are 
simply left unquantified, but are listed as contingencies to be 
considered subjectively alongside the monetised costs and 
benefits. If there is only one intangible factor, the decision­
maker will have a straight-forward choice as to whether its 
contribution or detraction is greater or not than the difference 
between the measured costs and benefits. However, in practice, 
there is usually more than one intangible item, so that CBA's 
objectivity lapses into indeterminacy, leaving the decision­
maker to compare hijSlown subjective evaluations, weigh them up 
in his own mind under his political objectives, or in theory 
the stated SWF, and thereby come to his rational conclusion 
and answer.
The assumptions implicit in the derivation of collective 
consumer surplus, shadow and surrogate pricing and the unaccount­
ability of some intangibles have predictably aroused the great­
est controversy in the process of CBA, involving the whole 
question of the practicability and validity of applying the 
monetary measure so widely and the pursuit of the efficiency
x
objective while distribution is ignored in the analyis proper.
x The evaluation methodology of the two major elements in user 
benefits in transport schemes, namely, the value of time savings 
and the value of reductions in accidents, is examined fully in 
the next chapter (3*3 and 3*A).
Even once values have been satisfactorily calculated, a 
further theoretical debate is encountered in discounting these 
values over the time to current worth, though without, perhaps, 
quite the same difficulties of practical application.
The Rate of Discount.
In order to accommodate society1s preference for present 
as opposed to future consumption, the costs and benefits, as 
evaluated at current prices, must be adjusted by the application 
of a suitable discount rate, so that their magnitudes in the 
future may be given an appropriate present value, thus permit­
ting the consideration of the cost-benefit flow over time at the 
common values of one point in time, the present. The positive 
discount rate of the consumer is an expression of his dislike of 
waiting and general impatience to spend, probably because of 
uncertainty ahead, occasioned by such possibilities as death or 
the future unavailability of goods and services, and his dimin­
ishing marginal utility of real income, as it is expected to rise 
over time and, consequently, yield progressively less satisfact­
ion incrementally. Also, in the case of consumer durables, 
assuming long life equivalent to human expectancy, a consumer 
will rationally prefer to buy immediately to maximise his total 
utility over his lifetime, rather than later when total utility 
added over a shorter period of his life will necessarily be less.
Although the reasons for discounting', may be fairly well 
agreedy .the choice of a suitable social discount rate (SDR) for 
public investment generates considerable academic debate. 
Basically there are four possibilities or theories:- l) The use 
of the social time preference rate (STPR), so that society1s 
view as a whole is taken; 2) The social opportunity cost (SOC) 
rate, usually based on the return in the private sector, the 
alternative destination or source of the public project funds;
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3) The rate on government bonds, which represents the financial 
cost of the capital for the project; U) A composite SDR reflect­
ing both the STPR and the SOC.
1) Social Time Preference
STP indicates the rate "which expresses the concensus of 
the electorate concerning the rate of discount they wish to be 
applied to future costs and benefits in evaluating government 
projects which provide services for future generations" (Bain, 
I960). It is generally assumed that the STPR is lower than the 
discounting rate implied in market behaviour.
In explanation, Pigou (1920,p25) originally reasoned 
"that our telescopic faculty is defective, and that we, there­
fore, see future pleasures, as it were, on a diminished scale". 
This argument claims that individuals ’myopic1 tendencies 
result in a market interest rate higher than the optimal which 
would derive from rational decision-making. Further, it may be 
thought that present society has a collective responsibility for 
future societies, so that altruism should supercede the avarice 
and supposed irrationality of current preferences. Similarly 
altruistic is the argument that views society as a continuous 
entity, so that the element in the individual’s time preference 
for uncertainty and risk of death should be rejected in calcul­
ating the STPR. However, values both individually and collect­
ively change over time in an unpredictable fashion making the 
•current standards inappropriate, and since future preferences 
cannot be known Marglin (1963, p 97) argues that it is 
'"axiomatic that a democratic government reflects only the
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preferences of the individuals who are presently members of the 
body politic11.
Another line of reasoning for the use of a low STPR post­
ulates that people approve of the government providing ‘collect­
ive1 goods for future generations, but in self-interest will 
conceal such concern, since they could not be certain of all 
other individuals voluntarily contributing jointly towards these 
future public benefits. Thus, the real STPR will be lower than 
that indicated by personal, self-interested behaviour in the 
market. Marglin (I963,pp 98-99) refers to this approach as the 
‘schizophrenic view1, in which an individual is regarded as both 
citizen and economic man.
Directing the STPR in the opposite way, upwards, is the 
hypothesis of diminishing marginal utility, stating that future 
generations will be richer than the present, and, therefore, 
will attach less value to each incremental benefit, so that 
there should be a positive impulse to the time preference rate. 
Assessing by how much this idea is accurately incorporated into 
actual personal considerations has proved extremely difficult 
and, not surprisingly, inconclusive.
In general terms, the use of a STPR can be justified on 
the basis of the two standard objections to the value represented 
by the market rate. Firstly, there are the technical imperfect­
ions of the capital market, "rife with rationing, ignorance, 
differential tax treatments, reluctance to finance from external 
funds, slow adjustment processes, etcetera, which destroy the 
normative significance of actual rates found in the market "
(Eckstein, 1961,p. 503). And, secondly, as with other prices in 
the economy, market rates reflect and reinforce the current 
distribution of income and wealth, whereas the government may 
have equity objectives in addition to aiming at Paretian 
efficiency.
Overall, the STPR is a useful conceptual device with a 
strong theoretical foundation, but, with its predictable problems 
of derivation, has not been used in pure form as an operational 
SDR in CBA.
2) Social Opportunity Cost
The basic argument supporting the concept of SOC indic­
ating the valid SDR states that, since capital funds are not 
unlimited, a public investment will incur the sacrifice of some 
other project, probably in the private sector. Therefore, it is 
hypothesised that the social rate of return on the foregone 
investment, or the lost benefit from current consumption, 
represents the level below which public investment should not be 
undertaken. This SOC is thus to be derived from the private 
capital market*s marginal internal rate of return, emphasising 
the efficiency criterion in resource allocation.
The major problem of identifying the SOC rate is familiar­
ly that market rates do not reflect social returns from private 
investment, failing to take into account external effects, 
shadow price differentials, consumer surplus elements and all
the imperfections of the capital market mentioned in the last 
©
section. Further, since public investments are reckoned to be 
generally of low risk, comparably low risk private ventures must 
be used, adjusted for differential tax considerations, to give a 
realistic rate. Under these conditions, Alfred (1968) calculated 
the British SOCR at between 10% and 11%, six months after the 
Government had set a rate of 8% (H.M.S.O. 1967).
3) The Government Borrowing Rate
The financial rate of government borrowing has also been 
suggested as the suitable SDR, since it represents the actual 
accounting cost of raising funds for public investment. How­
ever, this neglects the real social costs, taxation revenue and 
the use of Treasury rates for monetary and fiscal policy ends.
In addition, while all virtually risk-free, there are varying 
rates according to the nature of the government bond, and select­
ion of the suitable one is a major problem. Although fairly 
convenient in the direct observation of the relevant rates, 
conceptually their representation of the SDR has no valid basis 
and is little favoured in the academic literature.
U) A Synthetic Rate
The compromise of establishing a SDR by deriving some 
weighted average of the STPR and SOC, an intuitively satisfac­
tory, practical solution, has been formalised, and perhaps
0 They are also volatile and subject to dramatic fluctuations, 
so that even the more appropriate long-term rates vary consid­
erably and, accordingly, cannot give a reliable indication as 
to the desirable SDR.
validated, by Marglin (1967). His model essentially allows for 
the opportunity costs of public investment to be split between 
foregone private investment and foregone consumption. Thus, he 
determines the appropriate 1 synthetic1 rate, weighted according 
to the marginal propensities to invest and consume between the 
SOC and STPR respectively.
Of course, in the perfect market situation at equilib­
rium, both rates would be equal and the problem of the choice 
of the SDR would not arise. In the real world though, Bauraol 
(1968) postulates that the equilibriating process will be 
perpetually inhibited by institutional barriers and the exist­
ence of risk. His argument basically states that since private 
industry must earn at least the government borrowing rate after 
tax to attract funds, its ruling gross marginal internal rate 
of return must be the gilt-edged plus tax rates and, being 
viable, reflects the consumer1s willingness-to-pay for the 
private product, in other words, representing the SOC. There­
fore, the STPR, indicated by society*s willingness to lend to 
the government at gilt-edged rates, must differ from the SOC 
because of taxation, and, by similar reasoning, risk, and, 
therefore, there exists an essential indeterminacy in the 
choice of rates.
Despite the above proposition and some solid academic 
support for the pure SOC assessment, the U.S. Bureau of the 
Budget (1964.), following the Marglin line, recommended the 
procedure of combining SOC and STP as a suitable basis for all 
CBA. In contrast, the British Government* s choice of a SDR of
8% (H.M.S.O., 1967), subsequently raised to 10% suggested out­
right acceptance of the opportunity cost arguments and Mishan*s 
(1967a) contention that the source of the opportunity cost as to 
foregone consumption or investment is irrelevant, since sacrif­
iced consumption could have been invested privately, thus repre­
senting the SOCR (Mishan, 1967). However, in practice, especial­
ly under to-day1s rapidly changing conditions, the specific­
ation of the discount rate for CBA, as with the current 10% in 
Britain, is essentially arbitrary and based on political 
expediency within the bounds of the STPR and SOCK.
In the private sector, risk and uncertainty are incor­
porated into the capital market rate, and indeed the extra 
margin they provide represents the entrepreneur1s reward, or 
profit, for coping with them successfully. However, in public 
investment, with no profit orientation, risk and uncertainty 
must be treated differently, and this is the topic discussed 
in the next section.
The Treatment of Risk and Uncertainty.
Technically, risk and uncertainty are distinguished under 
the criterion established by Knight (1921), namely that the 
former exists when there is sufficient information to assign 
a probability distribution to the values in question, and the 
latter when no such knowledge obtains, but, in essence, they are 
very similar and the terms are used almost interchangeably. They 
mainly arise from sudden and unforeseen changes in consumer 
tastes, technological breakthroughs and alterations in the 
relative price structure through the effects of natural or pol­
itical upsets.
It has been argued that risk in public investment is 
negligible, since the government invests in a great number of 
diverse projects and can pool risks, and that there are no 
1 moral hazards1 of fraudulent behaviour, which constitutes a 
major component of risk in the private sector. Also, if it is 
considered that the government, as a societal entity, has an 
existence and interests apart from the individual preferences 
indicated by market behaviour, then public investment would be 
undertaken according to national objectives, such as a target 
rate of growth, with an implicit SDR, virtually indifferent to 
risk.
However, individual government projects do suffer uncert­
ainty, as evidenced by several aviation industry fiascos, and
x
leave real costs to be borne by the public. The simplest and
x In the context of urban passenger transport, a striking 
example of technological innovation nullifying recent investment 
occurred with the building of the Paisley suburban railway line
(cont. overleaf)
most popular method of allowing for risk is the addition of a 
risk premium to the discount rate, making risk a compound 
function of time, thereby directly implying that the further into 
the future, the more uncertainty involved. Despite its intuitive 
appeal, this risk premium device assumes that uncertainty incre­
ases monotonically with time, although empirical evidence does 
not support this, it applies to all items, risky or not, thereby 
obscuring the real nature of risk, and has difficulties, both 
conceptually and practically, in translating uncertainty accur­
ately into a discount figure, and indeed is summed up by 
Henderson (1968) as a fvery crude expedient*.
Alternatively, items with elements of uncertainty may be 
revalued, if costs, or devalued, if benefits, by a specific 
proportion, but such ad hoc adjustments to initial cost and 
benefit estimates are hardly an adequate substitute for a compre­
hensive and systematic assessment of risk, based on past exper­
ience and expert knowledge which deals with the total implic­
ations or risk rather than just simple over-optimism.
x (continued).
and stations in 1898 by the Caledonian Railway, albeit a 
private company with a risk consideration in its investment 
appraisal. Before the service could even commence after the 
completion of the construction work, the competition from 
the lightning spread of the electric tramcar had made the 
line commercially unviable. (Thomas, 1971, pp 224-5)*
A similarly unsatisfactory method is to shorten the 
considered time-horizon of the project, in fact specifying a 
pay-off period, perhaps where Prest and Turvey (1965, p.699) 
suggest na sudden day of reckoning when benefits disappear or 
costs soar** might be roughly identified. In fact, British road 
evaluation, up until the adoption of the COBA method (D.O.E.,
1972), effectively overcame any uncertainty problems by using 
the simple but inadequate first year rate of return ruling.
Again, this practice is objectionable since it avoids consider­
ation of later costs and benefits, in a similar way to which the 
risk premium diminishes their significance.
While it is these 1rules of thumb1 which are actually 
used in CBA, there are theoretical solutions to the problems of 
risk and uncertainty. Often, the elements of a project may be 
governed by 'states of nature1, which, on the basis of past 
observation and experience, may have established a frequency 
pattern from which a probability distribution may be derived. 
According to each state of nature, the project will have a 
certain outcome whose utility may be assessed. The decision­
maker then has two choices. He may either reckon that, in terms 
of overall social welfate, the risks of all government invest­
ment will cancel out, and therefore he should just proceed 
under the 'Law of Large Numbers' to maximise the expected utility 
of the defined projects, derived from the mean of their probabili­
ty distributions. Or, on the other hand, if he decides to 
formally allow for risk, he can use the 'certainty equivalent1 
approach, where his trade-off for risk as between mean and 
variance values is defined on an indifference map, enabling each
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project to be assessed at the common level of 1 certainty equiv­
alent* , established by recording the relevant indifference curve
x
values at zero variance. Thus, rational decision-making under 
the circumstances can be achieved.
However, another method must be employed in situations of 
new states of nature about which information is inconclusive and 
is insufficient to determine an objective probability distribut­
ion. Instead, on the basis of professional judgement, a subject­
ive interpretation of the possibilities may be formulated 
according to the *degree of belief* attached to each prospective 
situation, which also will possess an estimated utility. Various 
axiomatic systems, developed by such authors as Ramsey (1931), 
von Neumann and Morgenstem (1947), Savage (1954) and Marschak 
(1954), provide consistency conditions, under which both degrees 
of belief and utility indices can be simultaneously determined, 
so, by simply applying the subjective probability values, 
solutions may be obtained. While the great significance placed 
on individual subjective decisions for the good of society as a 
whole may be criticised, any evaluation of risky projects must 
inevitably involve the use of personal judgements, and such meth­
ods as above merely systematise and rationalise a necessarily 
subjective decision procedure, 
x
The shape of the indifference map will depend on the decision­
maker* s objectives. For instance, risk aversion may be consider­
ed vital in a depressed region, where the failure of a project 
might be crippling or, at least, more damaging than in a pros­
perous region, whose wealth and stability can comfortably 
absorb such consequences.
Where the likelihoods of project outcomes just cannot even 
be guessed at in a situation of complete uncertainty, decision 
rules derived from the theory of games may be applied, according:, 
to four criteria:- a) The Maximin (Wald) Criterion guarantees 
security by choosing the strategy with the highest minimum pay­
off. b) The Maxiraax (Hurwicz) Criterion attaches 'the index of 
pessimism' of the decision-maker in the form of a probability 
function and then chooses the outcome with the highest net 
benefits index, c) The Minimax Regret (Savage) Criterion adopts 
the strategy which minimises the possible difference from all 
other outcomes, d) The Laplace or Bayes Criterion simply assumes 
all possible states of nature equally likely, and chooses the 
strategy with the highest expected pay-off (Dasguptaand Pearce, 
1972, pp 187-194). The choice of criterion will depend on the 
character of the decision-maker, whether pessimistic, optimistic, 
cautious or random in nature, and perhaps on the circumstances.
Thus, the theory dealing with the rational treatment of 
risk and uncertainty has reached a fairly sophistocated state of 
development, but has yet to be incorporated into any CBA applic­
ation. Simple, but conceptually unsatisfactory, devices, such 
as risk premium, marking down the uncertain items, and shortening 
the time-horizon, are still widely used,- but the most recently 
introduced practice is the accompanying procedure of sensitivity 
analysis. A sensitivity analysis identifies the major assumpt­
ions as to future conditions, shadow or surrogate pricing 
arrangements, choice of SDR, and so on, and then defines the 
likely ranges of values and results obtainable by varying these 
assumptions within their feasible limits. Although this deals
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with uncertainty in the widest sense, such a variation in 
evaluated outcomes is produced, that from the decision-maker1s 
point of view, the sensitivity analysis merely puts the whole 
CBA into a state of indeterminacy, which only generates yet 
more confusion as to the optimum decision. The application of 
the theoretical methods for coping with risk and uncertainty 
will perhaps shortly mark the next progression of CBA towards 
the synoptic ideal of a rational decision-making technique.
■v> /-
2• 5 Decision Criteria.
The most generally acceptable decision rule in CBA is 
that of maximising the net present value of benefits from a 
project, although this has only been formally adopted for 
English road schemes since late 1972, and still remains to be 
implemented in Scottish practice. Basically, any project whose 
discounted benefits exceed discounted costs is worthwhile to 
society. However, because of the gap between the SOCR and the 
STPR discussed in the last section, as well as government fiscal 
and monetary policy, funds will be constrained and probably fall 
short of covering every project showing a positive net present 
value (NPV), which serves only as an absolute, not a relative, 
measure. Therefore, a ranking rule is required to order projects 
in terms of their overall social profitability, and is generally 
represented by the benefit/cost ratio, where gross benefits at 
present value are divided by costs. Projects should then be 
selected by moving down the ranking list until the budget 
constraint is reached. Unfortunately, the ratio is very sensit­
ive to the classification of items as negative benefits or 
costs, since this affects the magnitudes of both the vital 
(denominator and the numerator non-proportionately.
The alternative to the HPV rule is the internal rate of 
return (IRR), whose value in the project1 s initial year was the 
general yardstick for nearly all British road and public transport 
schemes, until the recent adoption of the COBA method (H.M.S.O.
1972). Instead of incorporating a predetermined SDR to derive 
present worth, the IRR, or yield, is calculated as the discount
rate at which the NPV of the project is reduced to zero. Thus, 
projects can be ranked by yield until the budget cut-off point 
precludes further investment, while, without the funds constraint, 
all project© whose IRR is greater than the considered SDR can be 
deemed socially worthwhile.
However, although decision-makers tend to find consider­
ation of a straight percentage 1 yield1 easier than an absolute 
NPV figure or benefit/cost ratio, the IRR does have its draw­
backs, in addition to requiring a tedious, iterative process of 
computation. The well-documented disadvantages of the IRR 
approach (Feldstein and Flemming, 1964-) lie in its discrimination 
against projects with long gestation periods, its inflation of 
the desirability of short-life projects, its supplementary 
modifications necessary to deal with mutually exclusive schemes, 
and its occasional production of more than one solution rate.
These inconsistencies all derive from the IRR being a function 
both of time periods involved and the size of the capital outlay, 
as well as the solution to a polynomial equation, whereas NPV is 
not affected by absolute magnitudes of outlay. Therefore, the 
NPV rule is to be methodologically preferred for public invest­
ment decisions, although the IRR still features in many analyses, 
and, indeed, can incorporate an allowance for risk into a single 
figure, rather the more unsatisfactory range of NPV*s.
Other decision criteria exist of which the 1 payback* has 
the most frequent usage, simply accepting or rejecting projects 
according to whether or not the benefit flows cover the cost 
flows by some arbitrarily established time horizon. Less
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pragmatic and more soundly founded is Mishan1s (1967b) proposit­
ion that, instead of discounting to the present time base, costs 
and benefits should be compounded to the estimated end of the 
project's life to give the net terminal value. Following 
'normalisation' procedures of allowing for differential compound 
rates for consumption (STPR) and reinvestment (SOC) and adjust­
ing projects to equalise their present value of costs, a normal­
ised IRR, defined as the discount rate which makes the terminal 
value of benefits equal to the present value of expenditures, 
can be accurately derived. The great attribute of this normal­
ised IRR is that it accords with the popular conception of an 
internal rate, as an average rate of growth over the relevant 
period, and is, therefore, more comprehensible to the public and 
decision-makers,
The criteria discussed so far are all solutions aiming at 
maximising efficiency in the administrative decision as to the 
selection of projects, with but one constraint, the budgetary 
consideration, incorporated. However, there must inevitably be 
a complex framework of political constraints controlling any 
public investment decision, particularly with regard to specific 
policy priorities and departmental or agency allocations, all of 
which should ideally have been stated as the government's SWF in 
the CBA's objectives at the outset. Indeed, projects will norm­
ally come ;inder governmental scrutiny before being subjected to 
CBA, and, if, at this crude level, are broadly considered polit­
ically inexpedient, they will be 'screened out' before reaching 
the analyst, who may find them embarrassingly efficient.
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Perhaps because of the massive disruption and implications 
of the large projects typically evaluated by CBA, the pressure to 
recognise the distributional effects, previously just lightly 
assumed away, has justifiably mounted to the point that it is 
generally accepted that CBA should consider distribution, but it 
still remains to be formally incorporated into the analysis in 
practice. As mentioned earlier in the short discussion on the 
SWFfs underlying CBA, some specific distributional weighting 
systems have been devised, though not yet applied.
Foster (1966), for example, proposes the use of a
democratic strength of preference function1, which requires
that all costs and benefits are to be scaled up or down,
according to their incidence, by the ratio of the income of
the individual, household or group affected to the average income
of the population. Thus, each gain or loss is multiplied by x,
where x = Y/Y , with Y = the national mean income of the unit 
i
concerned, and Yj_ the income of the particular individual, 
household or group* The basic principle involved is giving 
everyone potential equal weight in decision-reckoning by compen­
sating for differences in income, and therefore for differences 
in the marginal utility of income, and yet allowing weight to 
differences in strength of preference. In this way, assuming a 
linear marginal utility of income curve, a rational redistribut­
ive component can be internalised in the analysis, but the demand­
ing data requirements have so far precluded its actual applicat­
ion.
Following another line of reasoning that democratic govern-
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mentls bias in decisions is a function of its electorate’s 
preferences, Weisbrod (1968) and others, in the American context, 
have derived distributional group weights based on the evidence 
of recent government trade-offs between efficiency and distribut­
ion. Similar belief in the governments ability to reflect con­
sumer’s and societal wants prompted Krutilla and Eckstein’s 
(1958) use of marginal rates of taxation, adjusted for allowances, 
as surrogate weights for the marginal utility of income. How­
ever, it is extremely doubtful that taxation rates bear a 
simple direct relationship to equity and marginal utility consid­
erations, for they must incorporate the many fiscal facets of 
economic policy, but, despite this, the U.S. Bureau of the Budget 
(1964) has given some support to this type of weighting device.
In practice, though, there seems to be little chance of 
an internal distribution computation being incorporated, for, 
unfortunately, in addition to the data and weighting difficulties, 
governments tend to shrink from stating specifically their total 
objective function, so that they can retain their power of decis­
ion from the usurping analyst-adviser. In effect, the CBA gives 
the ’efficiency* solution and should state explicitly the incid­
ence of the costs and benefits. The government will then decide 
on the basis of maximising efficiency, subject to the distrib­
ution constraints, among others perhaps, that gains or losses to 
particular income groups, communities or regions do not exceed 
the notional level which their political objectives would find 
unacceptable.
Thus, CBA has emerged from a prolonged theoretical devel-
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opment, in which many of the debates are far from resolved, to 
a point where consolidating textbooks, drawing together a 
profusion of papers, have perhaps granted some subject entity 
to it. (Kendall, 1971; Mishan, 1971; Pearce, 1971; Dasgupta and 
Marglin, 1972; Dasgupta and Pearce, 1972; Layard, 1972; lieorgi,
1973)* Criticism continues unabated, both with regard to 
individual, simplifying assumptions and its whole, fundamental 
rationale. Yet, despite its shortcomings, which are examined in 
the next chapter, no generally acceptable alternative has emerged 
and CBA remains the best recognised appraisal procedure for 
public investment.
CHAPTER 3
THE LIMITATIONS OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS IN 
_______ TRANSPORTATION PLANNING.___________
A major, fundamental limitation of CBA as an evaluation 
technique lies in the narrow context of its use. In a full 
strategic evaluation procedure, as described by S.Z. Walters 
(1972, pp 5-10), the process must begin with an examination of 
the problem in hand, for which the eventual project choice will 
be the most satisfactory answer, under the criteria of people1s 
needs and the decision-maker1.s objectives. Such a basic consid­
eration should then generate a broad range of responses which 
will be selectively refined through the levels of policy and 
wide action alternatives until the favoured type of solution is 
determined. Following this decision, specific project options 
may be proposed, and, after probably undergoing a feasibility/ 
filtering process, only then will CBA be applied to a small, 
manageable set of projects, in order to indicate which option 
should finally be chosen for implementation. Therefore, CBA 
contributes only at the lowest and least important level of 
decision-making by choosing between a limited set of similar 
means to satisfy pre-determined ends which emerge from an 
obscure, but fundamentally vital, elimination and supposed 
rationalisation procedure beforehand. Indeed, such an imperfect, 
but typical, approach will conceal possible misjudgements at 
the earlier stages, where the goals and objectives formulated 
in response to the real problems are usually neglected, and 
further lack of consideration of funding constraints leaves CBA 
perhaps evaluating unlikely and irrelevant schemes of doubtful
value to the community.
Therefore, the concept of comprehensive rationality 
underlying the superficial appeal of CBA is illusory, since. CBA 
constitutes only a partial method whose operational ends and means 
are predetermined by the political process and may be couched in 
inconsistencies. Of course, CBA cannot attain the synoptic 
ideal in the real world of imperfect economic, social and 
political systems. Even working within ‘bounded rationality*, 
it can never honestly achieve optimisation unless the practical 
impossibility of comprehensively defining a genuine, operational 
objective function is somehow fulfilled. Therefore, the most 
that CBA can effectively achieve is the indication of the most 
appropriate decision under the circumstances, perhaps partly 
self-imposed, in a second - or third - best situation.
However, even allowing for the aforementioned method­
ological inconsistencies, still “it is always easy to criticise 
any CBA since in the last resort the technique is merely a list­
ing of the advantages and disadvantages of the project(s) where 
these are identified, quantified and monetised, where possible, 
brought down to a common base for comparison and presented as an 
aid to decision-making. Inevitably, bias will enter the analysis 
and for this reason alone decisions based on unqialified accept­
ance of CBA are not satisfactory” (Barrell, 1974)*
The first element subject to implicit criticism regards 
the identification of all the effects resultant from the project, 
intuitively, perhaps, seeming a relatively simple task. Yet, 
even the ambitious Roskill Commission apparently missed two
signifcant items, according to Mishan (1970, p.232).
Firstly, he argues that the proposed airport, by promot­
ing international air travel, especially with charter flights, 
will contribute to the global destruction of natural beauty and 
tradition by tourist blight and western standardisation, yet 
this cost is never mentioned. Of course, such an effect was 
outside the terms of reference of the exercise and its costing 
would depend on the objectives set. However, it could be 
argued, under Roskill1s apparent objective function, that the 
increased air travel generated by the new airport would have a 
negative impact elsewhere in the vicinity of receiving destinat­
ions, but this would extend the analysis to unmanageable propor­
tions and begs the question as to whether international welfare 
should be considered.
Secondly, in ignoring the effects of accidents and loss 
of life, the increasing value attributed to airport sites gener­
ating more traffic is sadly overestimated by Roskill1 s CBA. This 
point is later discussed in the context of urban transport eval­
uation (3.2). Since most cost-benefit exercises are consider­
ably less elaborate and sophistocated than Roskill, it is fairly 
likely that there is in general some failure in identifying all 
the project1s effects, although, in many cases, some may be 
erased through political screening or discarded as of neutral 
net impact.
However, much more contentious than mere identification 
is the quantification and monetisation of costs and benefits, 
not just at the technical level, but concerning the basic
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methodology and validity of the whole procedure* For instance, 
Self (1970, pp*249-60) argues that, since the common value of 
the £ or any other monetary unit derives from exchange situat­
ions, it is inconsistent to represent items not subject to direct 
exchange by monetary ratings* Also, Hill (1968, p.20) contends 
that costs and benefits can only be summed in the context of a 
single objective, and that the aggregate totalling of CBA under 
various objectives is conceptually invalid* Hence, nearly all 
factors by these criteria are incomparable on a monetary base 
and can only be considered within some kind of general planning 
framework*
A more widely held view concerns the incompatability of 
intangibles with 'costed1 items* Again, for example, the 
Roskill Commission, although reiterating at the outset the CBA 
principle that all effects be accounted, had to leave certain 
items unquantified* These were the long-term values of the 
conservation of landscape, wild life and historic buildings and 
the regional planning implications, ultimately left simply for 
individual assessment by the political decision-makers, who, in 
fact, decided that they outweighed the carefully costed differ­
ences of the quantified elements* It is rare, however, for the 
significance of the intangibles to register so heavily. For, it 
is widely recognised that decision-makers, and people in general, 
when comparing monetised items and intangibles, attach greater 
importance to the former, since a precise numerate definition 
is much more easily comprehended than a seemingly abstract 
quality, adequate appreciation of which requires exceptional 
understanding and mental effort. This is known as the 'fallacy
of misplaced concreteness1 (Mishan, 1967), whose effect nearly 
always underestimates the cost side, since most intangibles 
occur through the deterioration of the environment. Such a 
consistently assymetrical treatment of cost factors, partially 
left unquantified, on the one hand, and benefits, expressed as 
a money total, on the other, seriously jeopardises the ability 
of CBA to indicate the true net social worth of any project. 
Naturally, the intensity of the urban fabric magnifies environ­
mental disruption and, thus, this consideration has additional 
significance in city transport projects.
While misplaced concerteness and assymetry undoubtedly 
erode the very foundation of CBA* s methodology and myth of 
objectivity, controversy is fiercer over the validity of trans­
port benefits valuation, consisting mainly of savings in time, 
accidents and running costs. Running costs can be fairly direct­
ly and accurately determined (M.0.T,1968), but both time and 
health require tenuous surrogate valuations, which are examined 
in 3*3 and 3*4*
The final and vital element in Barren's basis for crit­
icism concerns bias. Wherever subjective judgement is required, 
and it occurs inevitably in CBA, as epitomised by Roskill, bias 
must be involved, unless there is an explicit and comprehensive 
objective function strictly applied, virtually a practical impos­
sibility, Unfortunately, urban public transport projects suffer 
from an additional and more serious element of a systematic 
disequity bias, resulting from the underlying assumptions and 
techniques of the transportation studies and models through which 
any schemes are formulated and assessed.
Inherent Bias in Transportation Studies
As with CBA itself, transportation studies generally fail 
to establish explicit economic, social and political objectives 
at the outset, and, consequently, the standard methodology and 
techniques applied are often largely divorced from immediate, 
real needs. Unfortunately, this situation pertains particularly 
in Britain, whose intricate urban forms and way of life are far 
removed from the car-oriented cities and society of North Amer­
ica, where transportation studies originated and were developed. 
Yet, with apparent disregard for the difference in context, the 
highway-oriented American techniques have been widely applied in 
Britain. As a result, transport planning has given a systematic 
preference to the car-owning population, with relatively high 
incomes, at the expense of the public transport users, cyclists 
and pedestrians, the relatively poor, who still represent much 
the greatest proportion of the urban trip-makers.
The basic land-use/transportation planning process starts 
with a survey of existing land-use, population, socio-economic 
and traffic characteristics by zone, from which the calibration 
factors for the model are derived to be applied to the forecasts 
of these parameters at the planning target date(s). The future 
generated trips, thus derived, are then distributed, split by mode 
and assigned to routes, according to the model based on present 
system performance, thereby indicating where transport invest­
ment will be required.
The disequity bias in such transportation studies is
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fundamental, for, even at the survey stage, no data for pedest­
rians and cyclists is generally recorded, and, thus, these two 
very important movement groups, consisting largely of the relat­
ively disadvantaged, are excluded from the basic modelling process, 
with the result that no ultimate provision is recommended for them 
in the plan output. Further underestimating their vital role in 
actual movement patterns is the simplifying, but distorting, 
modal split assumption* because of the household base for data 
collection, that all personal trips by members of car-owning 
households have the option of car use. In fact, only the husband 
in a one-car family generally has unrestricted access to the 
vehicle, while opportunities for his licence-holding wife and 
older children are severely constrained, and non-driving members 
are totally dependent for personal trips on both car and
1 chauffeur* availability, so that the household, as a whole, may
x
have a heavy net demand for public transport (Hillman,1972),
Aggregation of household data to the zonal level, in 
order to make the necessary computations manageable, also tends 
to obscure the movement problems of the disadvantaged, for their 
needs will be obscured in the averaging process. This situation 
can be rectified by the careful definition of traffic zone bound­
aries to contain strictly homogeneous socio-economic groupings, 
but this ultimately requires an extremely fine zoning network 
whose proportions would be virtually impossible to work with,
x Willmott's London survey (1973) suggests that not having a 
car available crucially affects the quality of people's life 
and leisure.
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except at fantastic cost in computer time and capacity. Thus, 
aggregation continues to conceal the large intra-zonal differ­
ences, which are probably much more significant than the inter­
zonal variations incorporated into the actual model, so that, once 
again, the transport deprived are likely to be neglected.
In addition to being simply passed over, the same dis­
advantaged groups suffer from the apparent doctrine of trans­
portation planning that takes demand as an exogenous factor, a 
function of independently determined socio-economic parameters 
(Plowden, 1967). In fact, demand, as in a typical economic 
model, is a function of taste, the availability of substitutes 
and complements, the pricing system and so on. However, by 
projecting forward the socio-economic parameters, car-ownership 
is assumed to increase greatly, and, therefore, in order to 
preserve consumer sovereignty at all times including the peak 
hours, transport planners inevitably have always proposed, until 
recently, a massive expensive and disruptive highway investment 
programme, so that, short-sightedly, the capacity is provided 
for the supposed demand. There is no consideration of the pres­
ent standard of transport provision influencing actual usage, 
which is directly equated with demand as a socio-economic 
dependant and, accordingly, little attention is paid to the 
possibilities of directing future usage to a more desirable 
pattern. This stems from the lack of any objective function, 
which might well approve such measures as traffic management, 
capacity restraint, improved public transport, provision of
footpaths and cycleways and differencial pricing policies in
order to produce the required 'balance1 in the urban transport 
xx
system •
While all these inherent disequity biases in transport­
ation planning are particularly disturbing, there are also great 
limitations in the scope and technical validity of the basic 
transport model, necessarily distorting a true appraisal, but 
not in any consistently divergent manner that can be identified.
At the fundamental level, by ignoring the processes of a 
full strategic examination, as advocated by Walters (op.cit.), 
the model is tightly and wrongly constrained by the refusal to 
recognise the interdependence of land-use and transportation and 
its implications. However, American modelling in the early 1960's 
tried to incorporate a two-way, continuous feedback interaction 
process, culminating in the Lowry techniques (1964), but, in 
practice, the complex and time-consuming iterative computations 
hardly produced significant enough results to make the operation 
worthwhile. Though alternative activity or land-use/transport- 
ation patterns have been postulated in Britain (Jamieson et. al., 
1967; Solesbury and Townsend, 1970), no study, except perhaps for 
the Strategic Plan for the South-east (1970), has attempted to app­
ly the concepts. If land-use variations are to be considered
xx Some studies do of course employ such methods, but generally 
only after an absolute capacity constraint on the proposed high­
way network has been reached, although more attention is being 
given to them now.
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and they are intuitively pleasing, although maybe unrewarding in 
practice, the methodology and design of transportation studies 
require a fundamental re-structuring (Smith, 1970)*
As regards technical sophistocation, the gravity model 
usually employed to distribute generated trips according to the 
attractiveness of competing destinations, modified by a measure 
of travel resistance, such as distance, time and cost, still 
lacks formal verification, although Wilson1s (1970) entropy 
approach does grant it some theoretical justification and resp­
ectability, Its practical shortcomings have been well expounded 
by Heggie (1969, p.93-110), who identifies its overestimations of 
travel in densely populated areas and when a node increased in size 
or attractiveness, and its logical inconsistencies in application 
to the real travel situation, which relates more closely to an 
economic model of supply and demand than to Newtonian mechanics. 
After his empirical investigations, Heggie (ibid., p.108) 
concludes that ”in general, the gravity model gives a very poor 
explanation of observed traffic flows. The margins of error are 
so wide that it cannot consequently be accepted as a valid means 
of explaining present traffic behaviour or of predicting future 
traffic patterns”.
In addition, the broad modal split assumptions, neglect­
ing the aforementioned problems of car availability, latent 
public transport demand and the actual quality of public transport 
provision, all imparting a direct disequity bias, have only been 
refined slowly and in a limited number of studies. Likewise, at 
the assignment stage, vast oversimplifications in single route
considerations within the context of complex urban networks have 
undermined the validity of the model, but now multiple route 
assignment, using diversion curve procedures, produces a more 
realistic pattern, though encountering some computational 
difficulties.
Much of the improvement in the constituent parts of the 
overall transportation model, or paradigm, has been due to their 
examination in terms of sub-systems within the whole system, 
which demands their overall logic, their internal consistency 
and the congruity of their connections. In particular, the 
development of a closely integrated distribution and modal split 
approach has brought the fundamental "structure of the model into 
closer accord with its philosophical base and •••• allows a 
choice to be made in a systematic manner between alternative 
policies which incorporate real options within public transport" 
(Starkie, 1973, p.373)* However, despite two decades of develop­
ment, the typical transportation model still possesses serious 
imperfections, which on balance impart a definite, systematic 
disequity bias, which is then further aggravated by standard 
practices in transport evaluation techniques.
Faults in typical evaluation procedures of transport -projects
In addition to the methodological inadequacies, the con­
duct of the recommended techniques (e.g. COBA, Hl/71) is often 
marred by minor errors, inconsistencies and invalidities.
Almost inevitably, these tend to favour car users by overstating 
the desirability of urban road construction, thus partially 
diverting funds from possible investment in public transport 
facilities. Generally, the capital costs of urban road schemes 
tend to be underestimated, and benefits over-valued, while the 
alternatives of public transport solutions apparently rarely 
merit any evaluation at all, are not considered seriously and 
are simply passed over in most cases.
In assessing the capital costs of an urban highway propo­
sal, the major item often, that of land and property acquisition, 
is recorded on the basis of "historic costs without attempting 
to adjust them to reflect social opportunity costs where necess­
ary" (Pearce and Nash, 1973, p.133)* Since it appears to be 
standard local authority practice to gradually assemble land to 
add to its existing holdings within the likely lines of projected 
road schemes, that same public body, when valuing the projects' 
land requirements, will register a zero or nominal historic cost 
against much of the area. Where the land acquisition involves 
displacing residents, as is likely in the urban context, the 
real opportunity costs will be represented by the total re­
housing costs, which should also include the necessary infra­
structure and services, loss of amenity and, perhaps, locational 
disadvantages if the new houses have to be built on a green-
field site on the perimeter of the city, due to pressure and
space shortage within. There is also likely to be an element
of householder's surplus, composed of his sense of security,
satisfaction and established personal activity patterns, which
form the difference between the occupant's subjective valuation
of his house, and the 'objective', open market price which the
x
acquiring authority records .
All in all, by the use of standard practices, the real 
costs of land occupation by any new transport scheme are usually 
greatly underestimated. Since highway projects are by far the 
most voracious in land consumption, the evaluation procedure 
will favour them in relation to public transport alternatives, 
which, even with fixed track, often easily put in tunnel, or 
other types of segregated systems, are comparatively low land- 
users, having a high density of person movement per unit area.
In addition, other capital costs incurred by pursuing a 
motorisation policy in a city tend to miss inclusion in the 
basic highway appraisal. The two main items concerned are the 
provision of parking capacity (i.e. multi-storey car parks) for 
the increased flow of terminal traffic into the city centre, and 
the additional roadworks involved outside the strict limits of 
the project under appraisal, but necessary to enable the pre­
dicted usage to be generated from outside. So once again, there 
is a serious element of under-estimation on the capital cost account.
x "The Roskill Commission Research Team concluded that an aver­
age surplus figure of 52$ over and above removal costs, for 
tenants and owners alike, was applicable to house price data"
(Pearce and Nash, 1973, p.136).
-56-
Even without considering the seldom appreciated social 
and environmental costs involved in highway construction, there 
is consistent, and perhaps deliberate, optimism on the engineer­
ing side as to their final bill, often through failing to take 
uncertainty into account adequantely. Consequently, road schemes 
almost always turn out to be more expensive than estimated, 
though this also applies to some public transport projects, and, 
in general, most public works. A Road Research Laboratory survey 
confirmed this, finding that the average excess of actual over 
estimated cost was 20% (Thomson, 1971).
Highway schemes tend to cause much greater disturbance 
and distress than their public transport equivalents, because of 
their greater extent and resultant severance, continuous noise 
and visual intrusion, vibration and pollution by fumes and dirt, 
so that the general underestimation of social and environmental 
costs is much more serious in the former case. The situation, 
however, has been considerably improved under the recent legis­
lation (H.M.S.O., 1973)> which extends compensation rights to 
those affected by public works. How those injuriously affected, 
though not actually displaced or to be displaced, join an 
enlarged classification of those suffering from planning blight, 
in being eligible for increased claims for insulation against 
noise, home loss payments, disturbance payments, rehousing 
costs, and severance of land (ibid.). The extra compensation 
involved is regarded as part of the cost of providing the road, 
or other facility, and ranks for a central government grant 
(after D.O.E., 1972b), thus being recorded in the capital cost 
account.
Although apparently fairly comprehensive, the Land Compen­
sation Acts (op. cit.) legally invalidate many justifiable claims 
by setting very restrictive application conditions, especially 
concerning disturbance and uncertainty during construction. They 
give the "impression that the politicians tried to do the right 
thing, but that the civil servants have done their best to make 
sure that as little public money as possible is spent regardless 
of what is called for by justice" (Justice, 1973)* In addition, 
little research in terms of economic evaluation appears to be
forthcoming in the difficult, but important, fields of vibration,
x
dirt and dust and visual intrusion (D.O.E., 1972b; Bor and 
Roberts, 1972). In brief, here is yet anotheriistance, through 
short-counting, of favour towards road schemes, with its conseq­
uent disequity bias, although some consideration may be alloted 
to these unquantified costs to uncompensated sufferers under 
their nebulous itemisation as intangibles.
On the benefits side of the evaluation equation, standard 
values of time and accident savings, whose arbitrariness is 
discussed in 3*3* and 3»4> are applied to the traffic forecasts 
for the first year of operation, derived from the doubtful 
procedures mentioned in 3.1. let there is a basic inconsist­
ency in the whole approach, although this may be partially relie­
ved when a 30-year appraisal period is generally adopted for 
urban roads. For, presuming the almost certain existence of
x Noise, however, has been extensively studied (H.M.S.O., 1969* 
Foster and Mackie, 1970; D.O.E. 1972b), and now quantified, it 
stands in the legislation and regulations as being directly 
compensatable when abusing these statutory standards (H.M.S.O. 
1973a, Sections 20,21; 1973b, Sections 18,19).
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latent demand, "there is no allowance for any feedback from the 
construction of an urban motorway on to trip generation rates, 
trip distribution, modal split, land-use or population location" 
(Pearce and Nash, 1973, pp.138-139)» so that the inevitable 
generated traffic is ignored. As such, a road will have been 
designed to the capacity forecast, the extra traffic will create 
significant congestion costs, which will then eliminate the 
marginal trips, leaving an equilibrium pattern with travel costs 
at their original pre-road level (ibid.). Conversely without the 
road, traffic would be much less than forecast, and travel costs 
at the same level. The frustrated demand for mobility could then 
be absorbed by high-capacity public transport improvements, with 
ultimately lower travel costs overall, as Lichfield and Chapman 
demonstrate (1971). Thus, "any scheme which will relieve the 
network of an equivalent amount of traffic will have the same 
network benefits" (Pearce and Nash, 1973* p*140), whether for 
private or public transport, but with the latter achieved at much 
lower social cost. However, the car-blinkers of transportation 
planning, now fortunately being discarded, have largely prevent­
ed such far-sighted conclusions being reached, although the 
Stevenage study and its success in practice should have stimul­
ated re-thinking as long as five years ago (Lichfield, 1969a).
Similar reasoning to the above also causes the over­
valuation of accident savings in the appraisal of high-grade 
road schemes. For, once again, the traffic is assumed to be 
fixed regardless for the target year, so that no account is 
taken of the considerably smaller volumes, with a lower absolute 
accident total, occurring in the situation without the proposed
road and its traffic generating properties. Even though the 
high-grade road proposed might well have a lower proportional 
accident rate, the absolute accident costs overall will be higher 
due to the greater volumes being generated and carried. On the 
other hand, public transport, possessing virtually infinite 
safety, could absorb almost any degree of increased movement 
without raising its accident costs from more or less zero.
Indeed, standard CBA as practised in urban transport 
evaluation appears to possess a heavily regressive effect, 
exacerbated by a general refusal or relectance to consider or 
appraise the public transport alternatives. In addition, motor­
way and expressway construction tends to be encouraged at pres­
ent by the structure of central government grants (Foster, 1972), 
and, despite the fuel crisis and a fundamental re-examination of 
transport policies, a high-capacity highway system rather than 
its public transport equivalent apparently possesses a prestige 
value in the eyes of city councillors as a symbol of modernity 
and affluence.
.3 The Value of Time Savings
The largest element, by far, on the benefits side of the 
cost-benefit equation in transport investment evaluation is 
invariably time savings, yet the validity of its values and 
their principles and methods of derivation arouse perhaps the 
greatest doubts in the applicability of the analysis* Although 
Sharp (1973* p.55) claims that "time savings alone may be 
expected to make up about 90$ of the value of the benefits 
resulting from a typical transport investment", the percentage 
in urban public transport schemes tends to be a little lower, as 
low as 72$ in the case of the Victoria Line (Foster and Beesley, 
1963), since savings in vehicle and accident costs become more 
significant where considerable private road traffic is being 
diverted* Still, however, with such a high proportion of the 
final calculation dependent on one factor, it is vital that its 
valuation should be valid and as accurate as possible.
The extreme difficulty of assigning monetary values to 
time savings arises because a primal value for time does not 
exist, for time, in itself, has no direct market and as such has 
no direct exchange price. In order, therefore, to value time, a 
surrogate measure must be identified and qualified, or determined 
by some logical, deductive process.
The valuation of time savings involves two basic concepts, 
the time opportunity cost of and the positive disutility of 
travel. In the first respect, travel occupies time in which 
additional, or less rushed, participation in both work and
leisure could be undertaken, and, thus may be represented by the 
value of these foregone activities. Secondly, it is assumed that 
people do not enjoy travelling, and therefore, the time involved 
in transit is of direct disutility to them. On the basis of these 
two fundamental considerations, the valuation placed on time will 
vary according to the particular circumstances, such as the 
purpose of the journey, the conditions of travel, the character­
istics of the traveller, and so on. The Department of the Envir­
onment currently recommend the initial division of time savings 
into two main categories, those involving working time and those 
in non-working or leisure time (M.O.T., 1969b), occurring normally 
in the proportions of approximately 5:95 (Tipping, 1968), with 
the differential slightly reduced for urban public transport 
schemes specifically.
The evaluation of working time generally utilises the 
measure of the wage rate, which, by the marginal productivity 
theory of factor rewards, is held to represent directly the 
value placed on the individual's marginal product per unit of 
time. Therefore, with production lost through time spent in 
travelling involving an opportunity cost to society, any in-work 
time savings through transport improvements may be valued at the 
traveller's wage rate, in view of the corresponding, potential 
increase in production. Since it is the net laboutr cost that 
an employer must equate with marginal productivity, all assoc­
iated costs, such as insurance payments, employment taxes, 
pension contributions, overheads and so on, must also be 
included.
However, as may be expected, like most ruling proposit-
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ions of classical economics, the marginal productivity theory of 
wages has only a very tenuous basis in the real world. Typically, 
the imperfections of the market involved, the labour market, 
effectively invalidate the straightforward application of the 
theory, particularly in this case, where controls and non-market 
agreements are manifest. For instance, it may be argued that 
wage rate determination is at least a partial function of trade 
union power or militancy, and, certainly, nationwide collective 
bargaining has distorted regional wage structures. Neither 
factor directly concerns any labour market consideration of 
differential productivity, nor do the constraints of restrictive 
agreements, imperfect knowledge, general monopolistic and 
monopsonistic behaviour, mobility limitations and so on.
Another major limitation in directly applying the marginal 
productivity theory to all working time savings is the inherent 
assumption that the period involved is then fully devoted to 
further productive activity. However, working schedules are 
notoriously rigid and often split into indivisible half-hour 
units, so that unless the time saving is of this magnitude, it 
is doubtful whether any increase in production will actually 
occur. Small time savings, particularly relevant to the urban 
transport context, will probably result in the same amount of 
work being completed more leisurely (following Parkinson1s Law), 
with no material benefit to the employer, although it may mean 
a happier and less harassed workforce. Perhaps, in the long­
term, there will be a tightening of work patterns as actual time 
availability gradually influences habits, but, even then, 
increased production will still depend on the buoyancy of
demand. In the case of the businessman, as opposed to the worker, 
there is liable to be more flexibility enabling time savings to 
be more effectively utilised, but, even here, there will be an 
element of simply 'nipping off home early1.
An additional problem of applying marginal productivity 
theory occurs when dealing with the self-employed or some kinds 
of piece-worker, where it is difficult to distinguish between 
working and non-working time (Harrison and Quarmby, 1969). In 
practice, as in other aspects, this discrepancy in theory applic­
ation is obscured in the massive aggregation process, which may 
allocate proportionately to both categories, according to 
sample data.
Finally, a third major assumption, that of the absolute 
disutility of travelling, casts doubts on the direct application 
of wage rates in valuing in-work time, through two major object­
ions. Firstly, not all time spent in transit is necessarily 
wasted. For example, businessmen may read documents, draft 
letters, generally deal with paperwork, and may even hold 
travelling conferences, all activities which represent at least 
some contribution to his employer's output. Therefore, it is 
inappropriate to regard travelling time as totally non-productive 
and measure it as though completely lost by the employee's full 
wage or salary rate. Secondly, the wage rate theory disregards 
the welfare of the traveller himself, by valuing travelling time 
only from the employer's viewpoint. It is likely that most indiv­
iduals, except for the uncommonly conscientious or ambitious or 
in extremely unpleasant travel conditions, prefer travelling to
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working, that is they experience less disutility in travel than 
disutility in work, for which they are compensated, supposedly 
exactly, by their wage rate. Therefore, in terms of total net 
utility, combining both employer1s and employee’s utility 
functions, to value in-vork travel time by full wage rate will 
involve varying degrees of over-estimation.
The theory fails in its application basically because it 
is marginalistic, yet dealing in terms of average wage rates, 
and because it operates under the single goal of efficiency, 
with no concern as to the distribution of the utility involved.
In the first case, therefore, it misrepresents the average 
wage/work load relationship obtaining in practice, thus failing 
to recognise the relative triviality of small time savings. 
Secondly, with its sole objective of maximising output, a vital 
component of net social welfare, namely the employee’s utility 
function, is completely omitted and the theory records and 
pursues only the employer's position towards profit-maximis- 
ation.
However, despite the limitations, the D.O.E. relies on 
the basis of the marginal productivity theory of wage determin­
ation as the best guide to the valuation of working time. In 
practice, for ease of data collection and calculation, the indiv­
idual employment costs of travellers are aggregated by their form 
of transport and type of vehicle, and given standard figures for 
the whole country, thereby, in terms of classical economics, 
favouring the poorer areas in the national distribution of trans­
port investment. Current figures (G.G.T.S. March 1974) are up­
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dated by 17% for inflation from the 1972 values of the former 
Ministry of Transport Economic Directorate Note 3 (1969, P*4)> 
which were based as follows*-




All workers 110. A London Underground users 115.8
Car drivers 122.4 Light Goods Vehicle
Car occupants 106.2 Drivers 52.8
Rail users 132 Heavy Goods Vehicle
Bus users 63*6 Drivers 
Rural and Inter-Urban 
Bus Drivers 





These values are assumed to rise at 3*25$ p.a, in real terras, 
supposedly in line with the national growth rate, but this optim­
istic figure bears little resemblance to the average rates exper­
ienced over the past fifteen years.
The valuation of non-working time, hereafter referred to 
as leisure lime, presents considerably more problems, for econ­
omic theory has provided neither a workable nor acceptable base 
on which guidelines may be fashioned. Classical theory assumes 
that the marginal value of leisure is equal to what is foregone 
by way of extra earnings, but, as working hours are set largely 
by employers rather than employees, with only occasional specific 
overtime options offering opportunities of variation, there is 
generally no marginal situation in which trades-off might occur 
to provide the necessary information.
However, without producing any direct results, research 
along the lines of classical economics continues (Oort, 1969).
So far, its major conclusion is that both the marginal value of 
leisure time and the marginal net benefit of labour underestimate
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the value of an exogenous reduction of travelling time. The 
derivation of this conclusion is explained in Appendix 1.
Since no theory is applicable, the valuation of leisure 
time has been based on the behavioural or revealed preference 
approach. This method requires observational studies of how 
people in practice trade off travel time savings against cost, 
although other considerations are inevitably involved in what is 
effectively a composite decision. Most studies have identified 
a positive relationship between personal valuation of time 
savings and income, but the startlingly large variation in the 
coefficients, between 1 A% and 98$ in the L.G.O.R.U. (1968 and 
1970) findings alone, has left a confused situation as to the most 
appropriate value or range of values. The D.O.E. issue standard 
figures based on the updating of the M.O.T. recommendations (op. 
cit.), but their general applicability must be fairly arbitrary 
(Appendix 2).
Five basic areas of travel choice exist from which studies 
should be able to impute an individuals valuation of travelling 
time. These are as followss- l) In the choice of destination, 
or the frequency of journeys to a particular destination; 2) In 
the choice of travel mode; 3) In the choice of route; A) In the 
choice of speed (at which to drive); 5) In decisions on relative 
locations of work and residence (Harrison and Quarmby, 1969)* 
Obviously, the fourth situation is not relevant to the urban 
public transport context, although some individuals, if they are 
so inclined, may go out of their way in order to experience 
possible exhilaration from the higher speeds of trains, as
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opposed to buses for example. Other related considerations, 
such as comfort, convenience, safety and numerous circumstan­
tial factors will undoubtedly impinge on the traveller's decis­
ion, which is also likely to be made without perfect knowledge. 
These extraneous variables are responsible for much of the varia­
tion in leisure time valuation among studies, whose situational 
characteristics, unless strictly controlled, are bound to be 
different. With a view to isolating these external elements, 
Beesley (1973, pp.166-177) sets out the conditions for success­
ful measurement of the factor in question, namely the value 
people assign to leisure time spent in travelling.
Since the results are to be extracted from actual consum­
er behaviour, much the best evidence will be obtained "when 
choice is confined to just two options", out of those listed, 
"since consumers tend to think in terms of, and more accurately 
report, single alternatives" (ibid* p.l67). So, althouth 
multiple choice situations offer more scope in observations, 
the simple binary trade-off tends to be more reliable, and, 
therefore, a successful study should establish that such a sit­
uation genuinely exists.
Thereafter, in order to attach meaning to and enable 
further application of the results, it is necessary to assemble 
the individual observations into groupings, which must "clearly 
justify their homogeneity assumptions and their relevance, when 
selected, to decisions" (ibid. p.168). Income differentials 
have almost universally been accepted as the primary explanatory 
variable, but more for its computational convenience than any
proven behavioural or policy significance in the transport sphere* 
Thus, categorisation according to income bracketing is adopted as 
standard practice, usually validated by a fairly high degree of 
correlation.
Another consideration of the study must be concern as to 
the purpose of the journey, in that the particular goods or 
services for which the consumer is travelling will possess 
certain demand characteristics, which should be specified and 
incorporated since they affect the decision to travel. Fortun­
ately, since it can be reasonably "assumed that the elasticity of 
demand for getting to work at all is zero" (ibid. p.l69), the 
journey-to-work situation offers probably the best study oppor­
tunity, unconstrained by complications of demand derivation.
For a consistent valuation of time, the 'cost1 variable 
should be as unambiguous as possible, so that the perceived costs 
are in fact the actual costs. This poses particular problems 
when using car data, for, in general, drivers greatly underestim­
ate the real travelling costs in a car, where the main expense 
is perceived as a fixed amount, comprising its capital cost, 
taxation and average, periodic maintenance. Notions of the 
actual car running costs tend to be clouded by the dominance of 
the immediate convenience benefits experienced in using the 
vehicle. Studies typically find that about 6$ of their samples 
make an 'illogical1 choice, and that between 27% and 52$ act as 
genuine 'traders' (Beesley, 1965; Lee and Dalvi, 1969 and 1971). 
The remainder permit some inference to be attached to the time/ 
cost relationship, but their views appear to be 'distorted* in
varying degrees by the dominant perception of the attributes of 
their chosen mode.
The findings of the major empirical studies in the urban 
context are outlined in Appendix 2. The basic document (M.O.T., 
op.cit., p.8) asserts that "these studies have produced a range 
of values which are sufficiently close for a central or average 
value to have some validity". The figures for non-working time 
were assessed at 25$ of the hourly income of the head of the 
household, and are given as follows (ibid. p.U)







Although empirical and theoretical values vary directly with 
income, these values are averaged over all socio-economic groups 
and all regions because of the "simple equity consideration"
(ibid, p.10). When aggregated to the household level, the 
standard base for data collection, the value of adult time is 
averaged out at 19$ of the household income (D.O.E. 1970, p.25).
The values are expected to increase in real terms by 3$ p. a.
(M.O.T. op.cit., p.5), although the reasons for the arbitrariness 
of this figure and its 4$ differential from the real growth rate 
of working time remain obscure.
The M.O.T. (ibid., p.5) paper concludes by stressing "that 
both the statements of values made in this paper and of the reasons
which have led to their adoption for general use are of an interim 
nature. Decisions cannot wait indefinitely for the development of 
refined methods of appraisal and aiialysis, so it is joecessary to 
make some judgement, in the light of admittedly imperfect know­
ledge, as to what values should be used Such judgements
must of their nature be expected to be revised as more and better 
research is carried out".
Only one subsequent revision has been made, in 1972, 
after the acceptance, on the basis of growing empirical support, 
substantiated by Veal (1971), of the greater value personally 
attached to savings in waiting time, due to the frustration and 
uncertainty involved increasing its subjective disutility.
Walking time has also been shown to be more highly valued than 
in-vehicle time, probably because of the physical effort required 
and susceptibility to the often adverse -weather conditions, but 
Veal's study (op.cit.) found insufficiently strong evidence to 
warrant a larger standard value being allotted to it. Now, it 
is standard practice (D.O.E., 1972c) to value waiting time at 
twice the in-vehicle time, with considerable implications for 
schemes involving interchanges or low frequency services.
There is also an a priori case for assigning an additional 
value to service reliability, which is likely to be enjoyed in 
train and segregated or priority bus trips. Although, as yet, 
insufficient empirical data has been collected and analysed to 
indicate confidently how the variance in trip times affects 
modal choice and the time/cost trade-off, this may soon emerge 
as a further revision and refinement of the arbitrary values
currently employed.
However, five years later, virtually the same values 
obtain in practice, even though their validity has been "clouded" 
(Beesley, 1973, p.180), especially as a result of such studies 
as Dawson and Everall's (T.R.R.L., 1972, Appendix 2). Mean­
while, though, considerable conceptual advances are being made 
by theorising in terms of a comprehensive time allocation and 
valuation model, expanding Becker's (1965) original ideas on 
utility-maximisation in consumer choice between alternative 
forms of consumption, subject to a budget constraint. In this 
model, transport time savings depend on the relative values put 
upon different uses of a fixed supply of time, constrained by 
the size of the time saving in its ability to be transferred to 
some other preferred activity (De Serpa 1971, Evans 1972).
This constraint incorporates into a formal framework Tipping's 
(1968) arguments against including time savings however small, 
and, therefore, probably worthless. However, the D.O.E. (after 
M.O.T. 1969) still maintains that small savings should be recor­
ded and valued, since they can add up over individual schemes 
within a comprehensive programme to provide significant time 
savings, and that the cases where the small time saving makes 
possible a whole new or additional activity, previously just 
below the margin of time availability, will counterbalance those 
where the saving cannot be acceptably utilised.
Nevertheless, despite the possibilities of the time/ 
activity - cost/budget approach, little usable data has emerged, 
so that the beneficial effects of transport projects continue
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to be assessed largely under the openly-admitted arbitrariness 
of average value of time figures. Unfortunately, until 
alternative methods become viable in practice, the updated 
results from empirical studies of the 1960’s will remain in 
command of this vital position in the transport evaluation 
process.
3.4 The Value of Accident Savings
Unfortunately, since solutions to a general transport 
deficiency usually appear to be conceived only in terms of a 
single, pre-selected mode, the relative inter-modal differences 
in terms of accident costs/savings are rarely, if ever, applied 
in a comprehensive manner in appraising the full range of alter­
natives for an individual link or a whole network. Consequently, 
the stark fact that projects for private road transport are nine 
times more dangerous than an equivalent scheme utilising public 
service vehicles, and no less than seventy times as accident 
prone as a comparable rail investment is ignored (ratios on the 
basis of fatal and serious casualties per miles travelled de­
rived from figures in C.S.O., 1973). The fixing of the modal 
split relationships is set in the pre-analysis Screening1 
stage without consideration of this vital element of relative 
accident costs. However, the accurate valuation of accident 
savings is still important in calculating the NPV or benefit- 
cost ratio, the measure of supposed justification, of different 
transport projects, since the allocation from limited funds is 
made on this basis.
For evaluation purposes, accidents can be divided into 
three categories; those involving just damage to vehicles or 
property, those which incur personal injury, and those which 
prove fatal. Since physical damage can be easily measured by 
direct monetary costs*i derived from the repairs or replacement 
charges as documented in insurance claims, it is the second and 
third types of accidents, where subjective costs are inevitably
involved, that pose problems of evaluation.
The most frequently used method for measuring the value 
of life and good health simply calculates the potential, dis­
counted output which society would gain had the accident not 
occurred. From this figure may be deducted the consumption 
which the individual would have incurred during the relevant 
period over which his life or freedom from injury is being 
assessed. In addition, allowance must be made for the costs 
of medical treatment and funerals, as well as the inevitable 
administrative and damage costs, since it is the whole cost of 
the accident which is being valued.
DawSon's calculations (R.R.L., 1967), incorporated into 
the T5/67 method of appraisal (M.O.T., 1967), were based on 
these concepts, weighted according to the age distribution of 
accident victums. However, since this 1 strictly material point 
of view* valued a female baby*s life at **£4560, it was reckoned, 
fairly arbitrarily, that, as all life was generally held to have 
a positive value, that the subjective factor was worth £5,000.
Four years later, Dawson's thinking changed (R.R.L. 1971, 
p.2), considering now that "the accidents that need to be costed 
are those which do not occur but which, without the introduction 
of some safety measure, would have occurred. The fact that on 
this basis the individual concerned is, indeed, alive means that 
the individual's consumption should not be deducted when assess­
ing the benefits of preventing accidents, as he is alive and able 
to enjoy that consumption." Consequently, with the retention of 
the arbitrary £5,OCX) to represent the subjective value of life,
maybe involving some double counting as Dawson himself suggests, 
the following values for urban area-accidents were derived, and 
have been adopted as standard figures (op.cit.).
However, inevitably, these figures and their derivation 
are open to criticism, for they are based purely on the maxim­
isation of gross national product, i.e. optimum economic effic­
iency, as being the sole objective of decision-maker's policy, 
with only a token factor arbitrarily attached for other consid­
erations. The logical conclusion underlying its reasoning 
would advocate that nearly all women and retired or older men be 
killed off as a positive net benefit to the community, clearly 
an unacceptable rationale.
Two other practical methods of deriving the value of 
accident savings exist and have been demonstrated. One relies 
on the effectiveness of the democratic political process to 
reveal the true premiums placed on health and life, through the 
implicit values from such investment and current expenditure as 
on medical equipment and service, road safety, and so on (Weis- 
brod, 1961; Schnelling, 1968). Although Mishan (1971a) has 
severely criticised this method on the grounds that it has no 
economic rationale and its determining political process can be 
purely circular, its results could prove promising once democratic
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decision-making becomes more genuinely participatory.
The other concept is based on the insurance principle, 
calculated on the premium a man is willing to pay and the prob­
ability of his being killed or injured as a result of engaging 
in some specific activity, thereby indicating the value he sets 
on his life. However, on top of the implied assumptions of 
linearity in the accident probability/premium/value relationship, 
there is the problem that, in the case of death, the insurance 
policy will compensate only dependents or next of kin, thereby 
reflecting the victim's concern for these persons rather than 
the subjective valuation of his own life. Where insurance is 
placed only for-flnjury, it might well give an accurate indication 
of the sum reckoned to offset the prospective distress, pain and 
inconvenience, especially where no loss of earnings is involved.
Mishan (op. cit.) rejects the validity of using any of 
these measures in CBA, because they are inconsistent with the 
basic rationale of valuation in terms of the Pigovian SWF, to 
identify a potential Paretian improvement. Mishan*s alternative 
involves the aggregation of what each member of the community is 
willing to pay or receive for an estimated change of risk to life 
or health. Although the theory is convincing, postulating that 
the trade— off between increased benefits at slightly greater 
risks, or vice versa, be identified in the context of a potential 
Paretian improvement, its quantification into usable statistics 
remains dormant, since the problems of data collection and com­
putation have so far proved crippling.
Therefore, CBA is left with the rather unsatisfactory
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measures produced by Dawson (R.R.L., 1971), and, as they are 
almost certainly erroneous, there is a bias imparted to diff­
erent transport schemes. Due to the inter-modal accident 
differentials, if the standard values are under-estimated, 
rail schemes will be slightly favoured, in comparison to bus 
schemes, with private road transport projects relatively 
worst off, and vice versa in the case of over-estimation. 
However, as was discussed in 3.2, the whole concept of benefits 
from accident savings resulting from new transport schemes is 
fatuous, for only traffic proportional rates not absolute 
figures are considered, thereby ignoring the generative prop­
erties of the new facility. In fact, rail and bus accident 
rates are seldom incorporated into any CBA and are simply 
assumed to be zero, but since few inter-modal exercises are 
conducted, their only significance rests in the claims of 
individual schemes competing for the allocation of funds from 
an overall transportation budget.
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CHAPTER A.
THE ALTERNATIVES TO C05T-BEHEFIT ANALYSIS.
The number of alternative evaluation methodologies for 
transport planning is fairly restricted because of the complex 
mix of elements necessarily involved in developing a satisfact­
ory technique. The requirements are most successfully covered, 
though, of" course, far from perfectly, by CBA, but three other 
methods merit a full examination in view of their different 
conceptual approaches. These are the planning balance sheet, 
the goals-achievement matrix and the ordinal method of evalu­
ation dealt with in the succeeding sections. However, there 
are several other methodologies or variants on the CBA theme, 
which will be briefly discussed first.
The simplest approach is to set the advantages and dis­
advantages of project alternatives against a checklist of crit­
eria, and by an iterative process, modify the preferred schemes 
until a design emerges which performs best against the conditions 
set. This basic method has been employed extensively for years 
in standard engineering, design and planning practice, reaching 
relatively sophistocated heights in Kitching's (1969) evidence 
to the Roskill Commission. However, its inherent simplicity 
renders it inadequate in coping with any degree of complexity, 
thus severely limiting its applicability.
Then, there are several techniques which operate from the 
relatively sure basis of costs, that is the capital and direct 
running costs, which can be assessed with a fairly confident
degree of accuracy, against which are weighted the more nebulous 
benefits of the various alternatives. On the one hand, the cost 
may be assumed constant, and the effectiveness of its utilisation 
by different schemes maybe compared to give the most satisfactory 
solution. Of course, this involves familiar problems of measur­
ing outputs when they consist of public goods and intangibles, 
but with the adoption of the comprehensive Programme-Planning- 
Budgeting System, ideally suited to this cost effectiveness 
approach, objectives can be explicitly formulated and applied to 
guide evaluation.
On the other hand, the fends! or benefits of a proposal 
may be held constant, while alternative 1 means' or costs to 
achieve them are compared. In practice, this technique involves 
holding the scale of benefits within a small range and then 
assessing them against the cost differentials. A similar con­
cept is employed in threshold theory, where designs are invest­
igated to find that level of investment in which the combin­
ation of overhead and operating costs are at a minimum, thereby 
optimising the narrowly-defined objective of economic efficiency 
by achieving a least cost per unit situation.
Another technique, that of linear programming, is quickly 
developing from its origins as a computational aid to CBA to 
being considered by some (Blunden, 1971) as an evaluation method­
ology in its own right. Basically it is just "an operational 
research technique permitting the optimisation of an objective 
function which is subject to a number of well-defined linear 
inequality constraints" (Duckworth, 1965). Those costs and
benefits which can be monetised are expressed directly in the 
objective function, with intangibles and non-specific goal con­
siderations represented as constraints. The computer can then 
comprehensively evaluate the details of alternative projects 
according to the overall SWF inserted, and indicate the optimal 
solution on the data given.
The advantages of this method clearly lie in the large 
range of alternatives which can be fully examined and the gener­
ation of genuine shadow prices, according to the given SWF, which 
can be re-used in standard evaluation. However, the familiar 
limitations of quantification effectively invalidate much of its 
potential application, for objective functions are always diffic­
ult to specify and the real world relationships represented by 
the objective function and constraints are just simply not linear, 
nor generally susceptible to any mathematical formulation.
Blunden (1971), though, has managed to produce a book in which 
the land-use/transportation system is expressed as a series of 
components and relationships, tailored to the requirements of the 
computer. Although, the traffic models emerge moderately con­
vincingly, typically, the evaluation procedure is most unsatisfac­
tory, in terms of its operation under social, rather than physical, 
functions and its incorporation of intangibles, as opposed to 
specific quantities. Non-linear techniques, such as quadratic 
programming, are being developed to extend the range of the 
methods applicability, but the status of linear programming as 
a concept, will probably remain as a computational aid and expr­
ession of the theory of CBA.
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Before embarking on a discussion of three socially 
orientated alternatives to CBA, it perhaps should be mentioned 
that conventional financial appraisal may be appropriate in 
the transport context under particular circumstances. For 
example, if commercial viability and profit maximisation are 
the accepted goals of transport investment, with road-pricing 
being implemented, then business investment analysis would be 
the correct technique to use. However, such circumstances 
are unlikely to arise, especially in Britain, where public 
ownership is increasing and the influence of the private market 
dwindling.
4*1 The Planning Balance Sheet (after Lichfield).
To Lichfield can perhaps be attributed the title offthe 
British father of socio-economic evaluation in planning*, for his 
initial ideas were the first published on the subject in the 
United Kingdom (Lichfield, 1956), and have subsequently developed 
on a parallel course with CBA, but always maintaining some vital 
differences which justify his 1planning balance sheet1 approach 
being accorded separate treatment. The planning balance sheet 
approach basically represents the set of "social accounts" 
(Lichfield, 1968, p.18) expected to result from the plans or 
projects in question, so designed as to identify explicitly the 
value judgements involved and, if not already stated, the goals 
and objectives followed in the decision process. In addition 
to this open, comprehensive and objective-controlled approach, 
Lichfield, in his planning balance sheet, stresses the incidence, 
as well as the magnitude, of the costs and benefits, and 
provides an evaluation framework in which intangibles can be 
accommodated on an equal footing with measured items. These 
two specific features largely combat the major technical weak­
nesses of CBA, as Lichfield sees them, in its almost total concern 
with the goal of efficiency, to the virtual exclusion of 
distributional considerations, and its tendency to disregard 
or undervalue unqnantifiables, through their secondary position 
in the analysis and the effects of 1misplaced concreteness*. 
Although Lichfield designed and has largely applied his planning 
balance sheet in the context of town development, where the very 
wide range of considerations are suited to its comprehensive
approach, the technique is easily adapted for use in transport 
evaluation. It was employed with a qualitative emphasis in the 
appraisal section of the Buchanan Report (Lichfield & Compton, 
1963), and, more recently, was applied to the questions of 
transport policy in Stevenage, its results advocating the 
committment to the now extremely successful 1Super-bus' system 
(Lichfield, 1969a).
In terms of transport evaluation, the method, in its 
matured form, may be summarised as follows. "The essence of the 
balance sheet technique is to consider the alternative schemes 
from the point of view of the" (Lichfield and Chapman, 1971, 
p.257) "various homogeneous" (Lichfield, 1969b, p.126)" 
sectors of the community who would be affected by the choice 
of scheme. These are divided into producers/operators and con­
sumers - individuals or groups who play a part in creating and 
running the services to be realised from the project, paired as 
far as possible with the appropriate consumers" (Lichfield and 
Chapman, p.257).
"The objectives, called instrumental objectives, are then 
enumerated for each sector •••• and the costs and benefits flow­
ing from these objectives are then computed over the assumed 
life of the project •••• and •••• discounted back to a common
base date......  Costs related to the travellers' objectives of
mode and trip quality and landowners' and occupiers' objectives 
of amenity and so on cannot be measured in money terms. They 
are valued by means of a subjective points system which attaches 
a .... score •••• for each objective in each scheme. Objectives
measured in this way are ranked in an assumed order of relative 
importance; so are the sectors. The results of alternative sets 
of weights .... in order to test for sensitivity .... show .... 
the implications of alternatives" (Lichfield and Chapman, 1971, 
p.267-8).
The final presentation then "consists of two closely 
interlinked but separate accounts", one indicating the financial 
consequences according to the institutional, legal, fiscal and 
commercial conventions in practice or proposed, and the other, 
"reduced by eliminating double counting, transfer payments, 
common items, etc., and by grouping related parties •••• for ... 
the assessment of the net impact on the community as a whole" 
(Lichfield, 1964, p.166).
Thus, the balance sheet, so constructed,"cannot, and 
does not, aim to provide a conclusion in terms of rate of return 
or net profit measured by money values as is the case in some 
typical cost-benefit studies. Its value lies in exposing the 
implications of each set of proposals to the whole community 
and also in indicating how the alternatives might be improved 
or amalgamated to produce a better result. The purpose of the 
approach is the selection of a plan, which, on the information 
available, is likely to best serve the total interests of the 
community" (Lichfield, 1969b,: p.130).
However, almost inevitably, there are familiar difficult 
ies associated with this technique. The initial operationalis-
ation of objectives at the outset, although an admirable and 
intuitively correct approach, presents formidable, maybe 
insurmountable, problems. Even just the conceptual formulation 
of a comprehensive goals function, far less its numerical 
expression, has eluded the efforts of many planners.
Then, at the output stage, the decision-maker is confront­
ed by the demanding task of sheer comprehension of the balance 
sheet before him, a vast mass of interrelated statistics, yet 
presented in discrete form under a myriad of headings and group­
ings. Although such an open approach allows an explicit 
application of various value judgements, the lack of a common 
base produces a very complex decision environment. Lichfield 
optimistically asserts that "good decisions can be reached from 
these viewpoints" (i.e. individuals' sets of objectives and 
value judgements), "or simply from flair or experience" 
(Lichfield, 1968, p.18), but exceptional expertise would appear 
to be necessary in order to establish a reasonable outcome from 
the multifarious analysis. However, to its advantage, the 
planning balance sheet does lay open many issues for debate, 
where public scrutiny may question the decision-makers* explicit 
biases, and thereby focus attention on the contentious elements.
Instead of aiming at the optimization that CBA claims 
with its attempts at ultimate rationalisation in the decision 
process, the planning balance sheet is essentially just a 
satisficing technique. Rather than pursue the 'synoptic ideal', 
Lichfield purports only "to identify the alternative which would 
appear on the evidence to be the best, or at least good enough"
(Lichfield, 1968, p.19), under the decision methodology of 
'disjointed incrementalism* (Braybrooke and Lindblom, 1963). In 
fact, the two methods are gradually converging in this respect, 
for CBA results now often give a range of possible 'best' options, 
while the planning balance sheet increasingly employs the more 
sophistocated quantification techniques, the products of CBA 
research, moving implicitly towards a more precise indication of 
the optimum.
Overall, as has been inferred, the planning, balance sheet 
and CBA are basically very similar, and becoming increasingly so. 
Although Lichfield does not apparently gain credit in the general 
literature, the recent improvements in CBA are concerned mostly 
with the problems of distribution and intangibles, the factors 
that he originally identified as being inadequately treated in 
CBA, and consequently stressed in his own technique. Perhaps, 
if the two approaches continue to coalesce , the emergent 
synthesis could produce a most satisfactory evaluation 
methodology.
4.2 A Goals Achievement Matrix (after Hill).
In introducing his new approach to evaluation methodology, 
Hill specifies his view of the inadequacies of traditional meth­
ods, intending to rectify them in his goals-achievement matrix. 
CBA, he claims is excessively dominated by the goal of economic 
efficiency, with distribution having little impact in being 
assumed away within the supposed synonymity in maximisation of 
national income and welfare. Any original non-economic object­
ives, especially when involving intangible items, tend to be 
obscured, as reduction to monetary terms stresses the economic 
and financial consequences, by the fallacy of 'misplaced 
concreteness', and can confuse the original social purpose of: 
the analysis. His major criticism of the planning balance sheet 
method, while appreciating its broader perspectives, is that it 
fails, in his terms, as does CBA, to recognise that costs and 
benefits have only an instrumental value, permitting their mean­
ingful assessment only in relation to a single, well-defined 
objective, although Lichfield has subsequently adjusted to this 
position (Lichfield and Chapman, 1971).
As an improvement to these traditional methods with their 
shortcomings, HiU proposes evaluation by his goals-achievement 
matrix. His approach demands the initial setting of goals, 
which must be operationally definied, as far as possible, by 
objectives. Then, on one of four scales of measurement as to 
specificity, the relevant costs and benefits are recorded as, 
respectively, retrogression from and progress towards each 
objective, to which weights are assigned for both importance and
incidence. The matrix thus formed may allow some aggregation of 
inter-objective results on a common basis, but will generally 
require the application of a goals-achievement transformation 
function, theoretically promising but operationally difficult, in 
order to relate outcomes measured in differemt units. Hill (1968, 
p. 27) concludes that "while this method calls for an extremely 
complex, time-consuming and expensive task, the conceptual frame­
work is recommended as a basis for rational decision-making.11
The key to decision-making by means of the goals-achive- 
ment matrix lies in the setting and weighting of the objectives, 
and the significance of their incidence. Although, conceptually, 
all these relative valuations might be determined by a theory of 
government, in practice, they will emerge from an iterative 
process of interaction among elected representatives, officials, 
various groups, both formal and informal, and individuals as the 
community's consensus as to the appropriate goals, and the 
various action alternatives that their fulfilment might require.
The advantages of the goals-achievement matrix, as its 
title implies, are in its clear specification of objectives, 
their relative importance, the effects of their incidence and 
their primary role as the ruling yardstick of assessment through­
out the analysis. This admirably comprehensive approach also 
incorporates intangibles and differing measurement scales, as 
appropriate, as well as lending itself to programming techniques 
and the testing of alternatives against certain, specified stand­
ards. However, it has several drawbacks too, which have so far 
precluded its practical application, limiting it to the hypothet­
ical evaluation of a transport project (Hill, 1968), and a 
similar exercise in recreation (Hill and Shechter, 1970). The 
major practical difficulties lie in the sheer complexity of the 
multiple-objective considerations, and, with the great problem of 
applying any valid goals-achievement transformation function, the 
matrix, involving not directly comparable items, leaves an indet­
erminate or open-ended situation, which, for a reasonable judge­
ment, requires considerable expertise on the part of the decision­
maker. Almost inevitably, largely condoning CBA, Hill (1968, 
p. 26) admits thaty"for the transformation of all the outcomes 
to a single scale, a monetary scale is probably the most useful", 
bringing the basic evaluation problem back to square one.
An extension of Hill's basic evaluation method is given 
by Schlager's (1968) objective fulfilment analysis, which uses a 
lexiographic ordering process according to the 'categories of 
importance' of the objectives, similar to Holmes's method (4-3)• 
Then, for each alternative, Schlager incorporates a weighting by 
a 'probability of implementation', subjectively reflecting the 
difficulty of implementing the alternatives, and the highest 
score according to this rank-based expected value identifies the 
preferred plan. Unfortunately, like Hill's, this evaluation 
technique has never been used in practice, and seems unlikely to 
become a substitute for CBA in actual project appraisal.
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4,3 The Ordinal Method of Evaluation (after Holmes),
The ordinal method of evaluation was conceived out of a 
concern that quantitative techniques, such as CBA were inapprop­
riately combining exact with imprecise data in their evaluations, 
which were involving reduction to common measures "by assertion 
rather than demonstration" (Holmes 1972, p.179). Once itemised 
in monetary terms, a false impression is given that objective 
standards of value exist, when, in fact, the actual process is 
highly arbitrary and often entails analysts ‘dressing up their 
own prejudices1 (Beesley and Kain, 1964)* In the belief that 
‘some important aspects of life* affected by planning decisions 
"just cannot be numbered with any certainty or sometimes, indeed, 
with any meaning, the alternative method of ordinal comparison 
was devised to set out a comprehensive framework in which 
subjective judgements could be explicitly made and logically 
related" (Holmes 1972, p.179)* in order to produce rationally 
an individual*s final decision.
The first step of the method, as in all evaluation tech­
niques, involves the identification of all effects resulting from 
the projects in question and their ranking in importance according 
to their assessor*s view of their relative significance or triv­
iality, Where clear differences of importance are evident between 
two consecutive items on the ranking list, a division may be made 
and, thus, a series of ‘classes of importance' may be established. 
Then, in respect of each criterion listed, the assessor must rank 
the performance of the alternative projects under consideration 
simply in terms of ‘best*, 'second best*, ‘third best1, and so on.
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Final ly, the decision procedure of !lexiographic ordering* 
(Kettle and Whitbread, 1973) requires the construction of a 
matrix as follows. The performance of the projects under exam­
ination for each criterion is recorded, with !best! at the 
second level of importance being treated as equivalent to 1 second 
best* at the first class of importance, and so on, as below.
The recommended project, therefore, is the one with most lst*s, 
and if there is a ,tie*, then 2nd*s decide, and so on.
Criteria Performance
Corresponding Positions 
1st 2nd 3rd Ath 5th 6th
Class of
Importance.I l) A C D B
2) B D A C
3) B A C D
U) A D C B
II 5) B D A C
6) C D A B
7) A B C D
h i  8) C D B A
9) D A B C
A 2 2 1 3 - 1
B 2 1 1 2 3 -
C — 2 3 2 - I
D — 2 U 2 1 -




However, Holmes does not intend these rules to be 
absolutely binding, a simple substitute **for the arduous process 
of making sensitive judgements" (Holmes, 1972. p.184). For 
example, should a project have an overwhelming total of second 
places, especially at the first level of importance, a decision­
maker can opt in favour of this consistency rather than for
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alternative projects, which might have just one or two firsts 
against particular criteria.
Cost considerations, though, do not enter his ordinal 
evaluation matrix, for he distinguishes between the unquantifiable 
sets of criteria satisfied by different projects and the measure- 
able resource costs involved. Therefore, the decision-maker is 
left to judge whether the increasing achievement of more goals 
by dearer, and presumably better, projects is worth the extra 
expense - an essentially cardinal process.
Holmes supports his method on its advantages of making 
explicit the emphases that a decision-maker may want to apply to 
certain criteria and its timesaving as a shorthand technique of 
recording and collating this data. The rulings ensure that only 
the really significant criteria influence the decision, and that 
they are not arbitrarily or carelessly relegated. When divergent 
views are clearly displayed this way, the opportunities are 
greater for agreement and conciliation through the immediate 
highlighting of the contentious issues, facilitating feedback and 
actual modification or redesign of the alternatives.
In practice, this method was employed by the Jack Holmes 
Planning Group to determine the best line for the new A9 road 
north of Inverness (Holmes 1972). In this context, it was perhaps 
an adequate evaluation technique, since the location offered no 
problems of complex city traffic networks nor the intricate urban 
fabric and the small planning team, by using broad subjective 
judgements in place of detailed data collection, quantification 








The basis simplism of the ordinal approach and the numerous 
i  inconsistencies it can produce render it open to severe criticism
(Kettle and Whitbread, 1973). In the first respect, by reducing 
all information to a simple presentation in rankings, the value 
of the planning data, much of which is subject to valid and direct 
quantification, is greatly diminished, with the vital expressions 
of differential strengths of preference by society ignored. No 
evaluation process can afford to neglect such valuable information, 
especially when advising a separate, cardinal treatment of cost 
considerations and, thus, breaking the consistency of ranking 
application anyway. Either capital cost is included as one of 
the ordinal criteria, almost necessarily of first importance, or 
as an individual goal of 'saving scarce resources', or else the 
validity of cardinal evaluation is admitted, since Holmes's hybrid 
version, based on a tenuous distinction between unquantifiable 
planning criteria and measurable resource costs, is internally 
inconsistent.
Secondly, by the nature of procedural rulings, the 
decision will depend greatly on the division into 'classes of 
importance1, which can only be established with some cardinal 
conception of by how much one criteria is more significant than 
another. Furthermore, there is the question of aggregation in 
the criteria, for, perhaps, several related lower order criteria 
could be combined to form one of first importance, and similarly, 
disaggregation could relegate the significance of a wide, but
vital, criterion to lower order consideration* Finally, by 
recognising the implications of regular second positions maybe 
indicating a better overall solution than an isolated first, 
Holmes effectively admits the severe limitations of his evaluat­
ion procedure, which must provide for the assessment of differ­
ences between items on a common basis in order to allow the 
necessary trades-off to be made*
While this ordinal method easily identifies the content­
ious issues and requires little effort to apply, its adequacy as 
an evaluation technique must be regarded as extremely limited, 
and certainly inappropriate in the context of urban public 
transport, which is the main concern of this dissertation.
"Sound decisions are only possible with formal evidence as to 
the wider consequences of proposals", necessitating that "lie 
should undertake difficult enquiries and delve deeply into 
community preferences" and implications of plans "in order to 
obtain the requisite evidence for intelligent decision-making" 
(Kettle and Whitbread, 1973, p.99) • Even decision-makers, them­
selves, though the framework is specifically designed for them, 
are not likely to favour this method, since their judgements 
are increasingly subjected to intense public scrutiny, yet there 




CBA has established itself firmly as the accepted method 
of economic evaluation in urban transport planning, indeed, with 
its impressive-sounding nomenclature being held in reverent awe 
by the public for whom it acts. Bora out of the private market's 
profit-maximising theory, it applies the equivalent goal of 
efficiency to the public sector. It, therefore, recommends a 
solution divorced from distributional considerations and other 
constraints, physical, legal, administrative and budgetary. It 
is also a partial technique based on marginalist concepts, and 
is incapable of evaluating situations involving large fundamental 
changes, which should be analysed within a general equilibrium 
framework. Thus, CBA is limited to assessing only the net 
efficiency of small projects, necessarily only one out of many 
possible objectives, so that it can be no more than "an aid to 
decision-making, not a substitute for it" (H.M.S.O. 1970).
Despite some progress towards a structure destined for 
the 'synoptic ideal* (as formulated by Simon (1957) and Rothblatt 
(1971), the pursuit of a completely rational model of decision­
making must founder in practice on the difficulties or imposs­
ibilities of specifying both the ruling objective function and 
many of the quantities possessing strong subjective valuations 
and uncertainty doubts. Though quantification techniques may be 
developed to reach peaks of sophistocation, coping adequately 
with elements formerly left as imponderables, the process can 
never achieve ultimate, perfect measurement of all components,
nor complete specification of the decision-maker’s goal. In 
this direction, CBA has been additionally hindered by its 
continued adherence to and association with its economic, rather 
than social science, origins.
Unfortunately, its role in the transport planning process 
is minor, being brought in as a residual at the last stage, to 
justify the strategy, network or project already chosen by the 
transport model, or, at most, to nominate its preferred alter­
native out of a narrow range of essentially similar, pre-selected 
proposals. Since the transport modelling procedures incorporate 
an in-built disequity bias, CBA, lacking any effective internal 
mechanism for distribution appraisal, merely reinforces the 
disequitable output and conclusions of the transport model, 
affording them a supposed justification of economic efficiency.
Thankfully, as cities begin to seize up and oil begins to 
dry up, the implications of the accepted transport planning 
practice have had to be reviewed (H.M.S.O., 1972), so that, in 
order to restore the balance in urban transport according to 
gemuine short-term needs, and long-term expediency, a policy 
orientation towards public transport has been officially adopted 
(H.M.g.O. 1973)• CBA has recently been subject to occassional 
adaption for some token distributional input, but its under­
lying structure, designed under the omnipotent efficiency object­
ive, will need a fundamental reconstruction to achieve adequate 
sensitivity to the distributional implications of its decision 
recommendations. Though, the policy promises and intentions in 
both the transport model and its economic evaluation are towards
a realisation that, after genuine needs have first been identified, 
the procedures should set appropriate ends and then establish the 
most satisfactory means towards achieving them, practice is slow 
to follow. So entrenched are the traditional doctrines of both 
transport and economic theory, and so fundamentally innovatary 
are the policy concepts proposed, that it will be years before 
the planning profession fully accommodates them into the framework 
of standard practice, and even longer before the problem of tran­
sport deprivation is relieved.
Although beset by these fundamental limitations, CBA is, 
however, currently, and is likely to continue as, the most satis­
factory evaluation method available for transport investment.
It is the best way of utilising given information for public 
investment appraisal, and preferable to acting merely on uninform­
ed or arbitary hunches, or being subject to other abstract, and 
probably more unsuitable methods. Therefore, while holding the 
aforementioned deficiencies in mind and recognising the long-term 
nature of their improvement, it is perhaps better to concentrate 
on areas where marginal short-term advances are foreseeable and 
relatively easily facilitated.
In the first place, it is essential that both CBA and 
land use options are integrated into the transport model, instead 
of being tagged on as mere appendages to the whole process. In 
this way, a much wider ran&e of alternatives will be tested, and 
it may require the rapid development of linear programming tech­
niques to cope with the sheer volume of computation involved.
But, only by considering a full range of feasible solutions, can
the preferred proposal be recommended with confidence.
x
Also at the outset, the decision-maker1s objectives 
should be stated explicitly, even though, as yet, techniques 
cannot, and might never, internalise them into the analysis 
because of specification difficulties. Still these objectives 
should explain and justify the omission of certain possibilities 
from the final CBA evaluation stage, previously a frequently 
mysterious, arbitrary or devious practice. Interaction between 
the decision-maker and the analyst should be maximised with the 
elected representative choosing the basis for data collection, 
the assumptions to form the transport model and its input, and 
the magnitude of the values to be attached to the vital variables. 
Public participation should also be invited, not only to satisfy 
democratic ideals, but to contribute to locally relevant, real­
istic estimates of behavioural elements. He, therefore, should 
determine the whole process rather than accept bemusedly the 
precise, and thus apparently accurate, result which the analyst 
has derived merely from inserting perhaps arbitrary measures into 
a model whose continually simplifying assumptions produce only 
spurious accuracy.
x In particular, the objectives concerning regional policy should 
be clearly stated, for the apparent presumption that transport 
investment is a strong stimulant to regional development weighs 
heavily in many decisions, yet is unsupported by empirical evid­
ence (Georgi, pp.52-60). Also, preferences for flexibility in 
the decision output should be indicated, so that the incorporation 
of the appropriate techniques for incorporating the possibilities 
of the uncertain future can be applied in the analysis.
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In this way, a transport evaluation procedure may be 
democratically structured, and councillors or politicians may 
establish, with people as the fundamental consideration, improv­
ing universal personal mobility to certain levels as their prime 
objective, rather than maximising vehicle movement or accessib­
ility to points, the material view that largely obtains in trans­
port practice at the moment. A personalised data collection, trip 
generation and distribution procedure, as in the behavioural/ 
activity base of Rutter* s (1973) individual-factor model, may be 
preferred, as well as criteria measured according to indices of 
personal opportunity through the transport medium for jobs, 
shopping, education, recreation and other important socio­
economic/physical elements of life. This type of approach might 
involve considerably more effort than its abstracted equivalent, 
but its potential comprehension to both politician and public 
would provide an infinitely clearer appreciation of the transport 
alternatives, and set a firm acceptable basis on which communal 
decisions could be taken.
A welcome innovation recently introduced into the CBA 
framework, and with further potential for development, is sensit­
ivity analysis, where a realistic range of values for uncertain 
parameters is applied to indicate the influence of the more 
doubtful assumptions on the recommended decision. Although this 
may result in several alternatives being suggested for implemen­
tation, the implications of the operative postulates are exposed 
for consideration, and, thus, rather than in a state of confusion, 
a proposal may be chosen with a greater degree of confidence.
An imminent requirement of CBA in Britain will be its
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inter-sectoral applicability, for corporate planning will soon 
take over funding allocations according to progress towards com­
prehensive objectives, instead of the present system of division 
according to arbitrary departmental claims or records. In this 
respect, common values or ranges of values will have to be oper­
ationalised in terms of the set objectives, so that CBA can det­
ermine, as far as is possible, all public sector investment 
decisions, including, of course, transport, on an equivalent 
basis.
Thus, considerable scope remains for improvement and refine­
ment to CBA techniques in transport planning, dependent on both 
marginal and fundamental progress towards an operationally- 
comprehensive decision process within a genuinely representative 
transport model. In order to achieve this, the transport planning 
profession must adopt a greater flexibility in attitude, be blessed 
with considerable powers of insight, and devote considerable 
effort to the necessary research.
APPENDIX 1.
The Evaluation of Travelling Time:
Efects of Rigidities of Working Time and the (dis)utility 
_____________ of Travelling (after Oort. 1969)._________
Since people often cannot work less hours than they want 
to, because of the standard working week, although they have 
flexibility in the choice of working longer if they wish through 
overtime, individuals can adjust their working time upwards from 
the standard working week more easily than downwards.; Assuming 
that the standard working week is a compromise between those 
who would prefer it to be longer, and those who would prefer it 
to be shorter, there will be few individuals who work less than 
they would like to, but some who work more. Therefore, the 
latter group will value leisure more highly, at the margin, than 
the net benefit of labour, and consequently, for this group and 
hence for society on average, the value of leisure time will be 
somewhat higher than the marginal utility of the money earned by 
spending the time in work, plus the marginal (dis)utility of 
labour, to which it is usually equated.
This can be expressed as follows
Let the individuals welfare function be represented by
IT = U(t ,t , Y) 
w v
where U = the individuals utility
t = amount of working time
w
t = amount of leisure time
v
Y = money income
and let P = the individual's rate of pay.
—_LU<--
Therefore, following the reasoning above,
6U P. 6U + 6U .... (1)
6t 6Y 5t
v w
Assuming that any reduction of travelling time, such as the
speeding-up of a commuter train or bus, for example, is an
exogenous event, inevitable and costless to the individual, and
has an inherently neutral utility effect, in itself, it may be
construed as an increase in the total time available to the
individual • Therefore;-
With T — total time available to the individual for
work and leisure,
t = travelling time (fixed exogenously for the
r individual)
- dU_ = dU = 6U_ P. 6U + &U_............(2)
dt dT 6t 6Y 6t
r v w
In other words, the money value of a reduction of travell­
ing time is still equal to the marginal value of leisure time, 
but the marginal net benefit of labour now yields only a lower 
limit for the value of an exogenous reduction of travelling time.
If travelling time is now generally recognised to have a 
disutility value, since people, for example, do not, as a rule, 
enjoy commuting, the straight increase in utility derived from
an increase in total time, as a result of an exogenous reduction
in travelling time, will represent only the lower limit, and 
usually underestimate, the value which individuals actually 
attach to that reduction in travelling time.
Therefore,
-dU 6tJ__ P. 6U + 6JL .... (3) 
dt <5t 6Y 6t
r v w
Now, the difference between the value of a marginal increase
in the total time available to the individual (dU/dT) and the
marginal utility of an exogenous reduction of travelling time
(-dU/dt ) is obviously equal to the specific utility of trav- 
r
elling, which will generally be negative.
60 .... U)5T
r
Thus, taking together the effects of both the rigidities 
in working time and the disutility of travelling by combining 
equations (2) and (A), the cpnclusion may be reached that both 
the marginal value of leisure time, by the two effects, and the 
marginal net benefit of labour underestimate the value of an 
exogenous reduction of travelling time. Empirical testing of 
this result has as yet proved inconclusive, but, intuitively 
it seems quite acceptable.
Therefore,
-dU = dU - 6U
dt dT 6t
r r
= 6U - 6U 
6t &t 
v r
= P. &U + &U -
6x 5t“
Extracted and modified from Oort (1969,pp.280-285).
APPENDIX 2.
EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF NON-WORKING TIME.
Those studies examined as the basis of the M.O.T, (1969) recom­
mendations :-
Modal choice studies for the .iourney-to-work
1) Beesley (1965) - Sample of 1109 civil servants faced with
train/bus trade-off in London. Results 
time valued at between 30$ and 50$ of 
income, according to the rank and salary - 
clerical officers=31$ > executive officers 
=37$, highest grades =4-2-50$.
2) I.A.U.R.P,(l963) - Large sample of commuter choice between
bus and metro for final part of jouraey-
to-work, after arriving at main-line stat­
ions of the S.N.C.F. from the suburbs.
Be suits; time valued at about 75$ of income.
- Analysis of time/cost trades-off in choice 
between public and private transport for 
159 commuters from Skokie and Merton Grove 
suburbs into central Chicago. Results 
time valued at 40-50$ of hourly pay for 
middle income groups.
- Analysis similar to Beesley with small 
sample for joumey-to-work to County Hall, 
London. Results:- time valued at 30$ of 
income for those earning under £1000 p.a., 
down to 15$ for those earning £2000 p.a.
3) Lisco (1965)





7) Claffey et. al.
(1961)
8) Dawson and Smith 
(1959)
9) Thomas (1967)
and above - figures may be unreliable 
because of the small sample size.
- Sample of 639 joumeys-to-work in Leeds 
with trade-off between private and public 
transport. Results:- a general range of 
21-25$ of income, but when two signif­
icant factors are omitted to match 
Beesley* s study, the values approximate 
to around the same, i.e. •§■. Walking
and waiting are found to be valued at 
two to three times the in-vehicle time.
- Dual sample of University College and 
County Hall commuters based on modal 
choice between public and private 
transport. Results:- time valued at 
20-25$ of income.
- Based on the characteristics of passen­
ger car travel on toll roads and compar­
able free roads. Results:- 42-50p. per 
hour was put on the value of time, but 
this range is not felt to be reliable.
- Analysis based on trade-offs between 
using Queensferry route or upstream 
Kincardine Bridge. Results;- time valued 
at 36-47p. per hour, but not reliable.
■ Analysis of time/cost trade-off in choice
of tolled or untolled roads. Resultss- 
vary from 4-0$ to 83$ of income under 
different assumptions.
Other Studies
10) Mohring (i960) - Analysis of the trade-off between commuting
costs and housing costs in residential 
location decision. Results:- time valued 
at 22-4.3$ of income.
11) Mohring (1965) - Analysis of time/car running costs with
speed as the variant. Results:- time 
valued at £1 per hour.
On the basis of these studies, the Ministry of Transport (1969) 
choose to recommend values at 25$ of income.
Later Studies of Significance
a) L.G.O.R.U. (1968 - Observations on modal choice in the
and 1970)
journey-to-work were made in four cities; 
Leeds, Leicester, Manchester and Liver­
pool. Because of the differences in the 
range of choice of modal opportunities 
in the four cities, a startling varia­
tion from 14$ in Leeds to 98$ in Leices­
ter was found in the valuation of in- 
vehicle time as a proportion of hourly 
wage rates, but, by adjusting for the 
different situations, an average value 
of 24$ of income was derived.
b) Lee and Dalvi (1969- 1966 sample of 1000 joumeys-to-work in
and 1970)
Central Manchester. The results give a
broad variation between 15$ and 4-5$, 
reduced to just 25-30$ of income in the 
major, central range.
c) Veal (1971) - Survey of short urban leisure trips. Results:-
in-vehicle tine valued at only 9-12p. per hour, 
with walking time at a slightly higher level, 
but waiting time twice as much.
d) D.O.E. (1971a) - Analysis of time/cost trade off in modal
choice between Solent hovercraft and ferr­
ies. Results:- very wide range with time 
valued at between 15p. and 858p. per hour, 
probably due to the unusual nature of the 
inter-modal differences.
e) Dawson and - Italian study of choice between tolled
Everail (1972)
autostrada and equivalent free road using 
multiple logit analysis rather than the 
usual discriminant technique. Results;- 
time valued at between 90p. and £1.25 per 
hour. Authors streaa importance of the 
comfort factor of travelling on the auto­
strada and qualify the applicability of 
the results to Britain, because of exchange 
problems, and differences in habits, 
customs and attitudes.
These studies (a-e) have cast considerable doubt on the M.O.T.
(1969) figures and their derivation, as suggested by Beesley 
(1973, p.180).
(The information in this appendix has been taken from Harrison 
and Quarmby (1969), M.O.T. (1969), Beesley (1973) and the indiv­
idual Studies themselves, where available).
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